Optimal number of privatised products in a differentiated mixed oligopoly with free market entry

Optimal number of privatised products in a differentiated mixed oligopoly with free market entry
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自由市场准入的差异化混合寡头垄断中私有化产品的最佳数量

DOI:
10.1111/1467-8454.12223
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
1.9
通讯作者:
Kawasaki Akio
Kawasaki Akio
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tanaka Katsuyuki;Higashide Takuo;Kinkyo Takuji;Hamori Shigeyuki;宇仁宏幸・藤田真哉・北川亘太;Ayako Saiki;道田 悦代;Yuka Takeda;Kawasaki Akio

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本研究探讨当一家上市公司生产多种产品时,私有化政策如何影响长期市场均衡。它有助于文献(a)检查私有化政策对多产品上市公司的长期影响和(B)调查是否市场的特点是过度或不充分的进入时,在长期均衡。本研究假设经济中存在多产品上市公司和生产一种产品的潜在私人公司进入者。上市公司可以将某些生产部门私有化,私有化的公司只生产一种产品,潜在的进入者私营公司可以通过承担进入成本进入市场。上市公司决定多少部门私有化。私营企业进入市场,如果他们赚取非负利润。研究结果表明,从长远来看,完全国有化在社会上是可取的。在均衡状态下,当上市公司的生产部门数量较少时,很容易出现超额进入;匡威亦然。研究结果可能有助于政府决定其私有化政策,并有助于私营部门决定是否进入以前由政府垄断的市场。
This study investigates how a privatisation policy affects long‐run market equilibrium when a public firm produces multiple products. It contributes to the literature by (a) examining the long‐run effect of a privatisation policy on a multi‐product public firm and (b) investigating whether the market is characterised by excess or insufficient entry when in long‐run equilibrium. This study assumes that there is a multi‐product public firm and potential private firm entrants that produce one product in the economy. The public firm can privatise some production sectors, the privatised firm produces only one product, and the potential entrant private firm can enter the market by incurring entry costs. The public firm decides how many sectors to privatise. The private firms enter the market if they earn non‐negative profits. The study's findings show that full nationalisation is socially preferable in the long run. In equilibrium, when the number of production sectors of the public firm is small, excess entry occurs easily; the converse is also true. The results may assist the government in determining its privatisation policy and the private sector in determining whether to enter markets that were previously monopolised by the government.
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期刊: ERN: Monopoly
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具有部分外资所有权和不对称边际成本增加的混合双头垄断中的内生时机博弈
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.12170
发表时间: 2020
影响因子: 1.9
作者:
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