Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?
Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy?
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组织权力:薪酬异质性是否应该反映等级制度?
DOI:
10.1007/s10058-016-0189-x
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
We model and experimentally investigate effort levels in team production as a public good game with heterogeneous remuneration. In a hierarchically organized firm, team leaders (allocators) determine the effort levels of all team members. When the allocator receives equal payment or twice as much as the other workers, this results in the same team production, but when the allocator receives only half of what the other workers receive, team production is diminished.
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影响因子:
1.6
作者:
F. Bolle;C. Vogel
通讯作者:
C. Vogel
DOI:
10.1016/j.socec.2011.10.012
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
Journal of Socio-economics
影响因子:
--
作者:
Kenneth S. Chan;Stuart Mestelman;R. Muller;Rob Moir
通讯作者:
Rob Moir
影响因子:
9.8
作者:
D. Mcclelland
通讯作者:
D. Mcclelland
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.968942
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series
影响因子:
--
作者:
Martin Beckenkamp;Heike Hennig�?Schmidt;F. Maier
通讯作者:
F. Maier
影响因子:
2.3
作者:
Neslihan Uler
通讯作者:
Neslihan Uler