Game theory of mind.
Game theory of mind.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000254
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发表时间：
2008-12
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Friston KJ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yoshida W;Dolan RJ;Friston KJ
本文介绍了“思想理论”的模型，即我们如何代表他人的意图和目标，以优化我们的相互作用，我们考虑实用程序或奖励规定的价值函数的代表。但是，我对您的代表，等等。选项的复杂性，给定的行为交流。最终，使用“雄鹿狩猎”的模拟和真实数据来证明模型的比较，我们注意到可以通过优化效用函数本身（通过亲社会效用）来实现相同的复杂行为，从而产生了不合理的但显然是利他的可能与层次游戏理论和协同进化有关。
确定其他人在进行有效的社交互动至关重要的能力，无论是合作的还是广泛的示例：很难单独捕捉大猎物，但是我们可以通过与他人的合作来阐明这一点，狩猎可以使私人目标捕获较小的猎物，这可以与需要合作的互惠目标捕捉到我们如何制定合作和竞争的最佳策略。行为经济学，我们建议使用“递归社会化”的“思想理论”模型，其中我的目标模型包括您的目标模型，以及通过研究实验数据的模型。我们表明，基于计算机的小组狩猎游戏，该模型在这种情况下很好地说明了个人决策，这表明这种正式的“心理理论”模型可以阐明人们如何在社交互动中建立其他人的内部表现。
This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution. The ability to work out what other people are thinking is essential for effective social interactions, be they cooperative or competitive. A widely used example is cooperative hunting: large prey is difficult to catch alone, but we can circumvent this by cooperating with others. However, hunting can pit private goals to catch smaller prey that can be caught alone against mutually beneficial goals that require cooperation. Understanding how we work out optimal strategies that balance cooperation and competition has remained a central puzzle in game theory. Exploiting insights from computer science and behavioural economics, we suggest a model of ‘theory of mind’ using ‘recursive sophistication’ in which my model of your goals includes a model of your model of my goals, and so on ad infinitum. By studying experimental data in which people played a computer-based group hunting game, we show that the model offers a good account of individual decisions in this context, suggesting that such a formal ‘theory of mind’ model can cast light on how people build internal representations of other people in social interactions.
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0711099105
发表时间：
2008-05-06
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Hampton, Alan N.;Bossaerts, Peter;O'Doherty, John P.
通讯作者：
O'Doherty, John P.
影响因子：
13.7
作者：
Camerer, CF;Ho, TH;Chong, JK
通讯作者：
Chong, JK
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0604475103
发表时间：
2006-10-17
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Moll, Jorge;Krueger, Frank;Grafman, Jordan
通讯作者：
Grafman, Jordan
影响因子：
5.7
作者：
Gallagher, HL;Jack, AI;Frith, CD
通讯作者：
Frith, CD
影响因子：
5
作者：
Gmytrasiewicz, PJ;Doshi, P
通讯作者：
Doshi, P