Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement
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最佳执法中的谎言厌恶和自我报告
DOI：
10.1007/s11149-017-9329-7
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
R. Innes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Innes
个人或公司自我报告违规行为的要求在监管和执法中很常见。本文研究了违法者对撒谎的厌恶如何影响要求自我报告的执法制度的设计和优点。即使自我报告的要求产生了谎言的成本，而且在没有谎言厌恶的情况下也没有经济优势，我发现自我报告提高了执法效率。有了谎言厌恶，自我报告能够以较低的监测成本更大地威慑违规行为。这一结果的必然结果是：(1)谎言厌恶的存在提高了社会福利；(2)在虚假报告时导致更多有害谎言的执行制度--例如，强制与自愿的自我报告特征--是有利的；以及(3)在最优的执行制度下，撒谎通常发生，自我报告的惩罚高于对虚假报告的平均惩罚。
Requirements that individuals or companies self-report violations are common in regulation and law enforcement. This paper studies how violators’ aversion to lying affects the design and merit of enforcement regimes that require self-reporting. Even when a self-reporting requirement produces costs of lies and enjoys no economic advantage in the absence of lie aversion, I find that self-reporting improves enforcement efficiency. With lie aversion, self-reporting enables greater deterrence of violations at a lower cost of monitoring. Corollaries to this result are that (1) the presence of lie aversion enhances social welfare; (2) enforcement regimes that elicit more noxious lies when false reports are made—for example, a compulsory versus voluntary self-reporting feature—are advantageous; and (3) under an optimal enforcement regime, lying generally occurs and the self-reporting sanction is higher than the average sanction for a false report.
影响因子：
9.8
作者：
Abeler, Johannes;Becker, Anke;Falk, Armin
通讯作者：
Falk, Armin
影响因子：
3.6
作者：
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
通讯作者：
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska