Land law reform in Kenya: Devolution, veto players, and the limits of an institutional fix

Land law reform in Kenya: Devolution, veto players, and the limits of an institutional fix
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肯尼亚的土地法改革:权力下放、否决权参与者和制度修复的局限性

DOI:
10.1093/afraf/ady053
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
影响因子:
2.8
通讯作者:
Boone C
Boone C
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Boone C

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自上世纪90年代以来,非洲国家良好治理议程的大部分承诺都依赖于旨在“完善制度”的改革,有时是通过创建超越党派政治斗争的监管机构。这种“制度修复”策略常常受挫,因为新的制度本身就嵌入了现有的国家结构和权力关系中。文章认为,在2012-2016年期间实施肯尼亚土地法改革就说明了这一动态。在肯尼亚,民主结构和2010年宪法将权力下放给县政府创造了一个复杂的机构竞技场,其轮廓塑造了改革的进程。国家和县两级国家行政机构和代表机构中的不同行为者被赋予“否决权参与者”的权力,实现改革任务需要得到他们的同意和合作。对肯尼亚8个县的土地管理改革的分析表明,否决权的参与者如何能够减缓或限制新土地法的实施。专注于非正式权力网络和国家能力丧失的非洲政治理论,可能会忽略正式的国家结构及其内部授权的参与者能够在多大程度上影响改革进程,要么是通过挫败新法律的改革派主旨,要么是试图利用它们的改革派潜力。
Much of the promise of the good governance agenda in African countries since the 1990s rested on reforms aimed at ‘getting the institutions right’, sometimes by creating regulatory agencies that would be above the fray of partisan politics. Such ‘institutional fix’ strategies are often frustrated because the new institutions themselves are embedded in existing state structures and power relations. The article argues that implementing Kenya’s land law reforms in the 2012–2016 period illustrates this dynamic. In Kenya, democratic structures and the 2010 constitutional devolution of power to county governments created a complex institutional playing field, the contours of which shaped the course of reform. Diverse actors in both administrative and representative institutions of the state, at both the national and county levels, were empowered as ‘veto players’ whose consent and cooperation was required to realize the reform mandate. An analysis of land administration reform in eight Kenyan counties shows how veto players were able to slow or curtail the implementation of the new land laws. Theories of African politics that focus on informal power networks and state incapacity may miss the extent to which formal state structures and the actors empowered within them can shape the course of reform, either by thwarting the reformist thrust of new laws or by trying to harness their reformist potential.
非洲的权力下放和治理冲突:肯尼亚情景
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另外,权力下放后肯尼亚的县级政治发生了变化吗?
DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2013.869073
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政治分配的土地权和选举暴力的地理分布
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