Mitigating Voltage Attacks in Multi-Tenant FPGAs

Mitigating Voltage Attacks in Multi-Tenant FPGAs
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减轻多租户 FPGA 中的电压攻击

DOI:
10.1145/3451236
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Tessier, Russell
Tessier, Russell
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Provelengios, George;Holcomb, Daniel;Tessier, Russell

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最近的研究已经暴露了一些与在嵌入式系统和云计算环境中使用fpga相关的安全问题。恶意的云FPGA用户可以精心设计故意浪费功率的电路,并部署以导致拒绝服务和故障注入攻击。FPGA云服务使用的主要防御策略包括检查用户提交的电路结构设计,这些设计已知会大量消耗功率。不幸的是,这种方法受到攻击者构思新设计的能力的限制,这些设计可以击败现有的检查器。在这项工作中,我们的贡献是双重的。我们评估了各种电路功耗浪费技术,这些技术通常不会被FPGA云计算供应商强加的设计规则检查所标记。包括我们的新设计在内的五种功耗浪费电路的效率是根据每个逻辑资源的功耗来评估的。然后,我们表明可以识别基于功率浪费的电压攻击源。我们的监控方法可以定位攻击,并将目标区域的时钟信号抑制在21 μs以内,这足以在导致单板复位之前阻止攻击。所有实验均使用最先进的英特尔Stratix 10 FPGA进行。
Recent research has exposed a number of security issues related to the use of FPGAs in embedded system and cloud computing environments. Circuits that deliberately waste power can be carefully crafted by a malicious cloud FPGA user and deployed to cause denial-of-service and fault injection attacks. The main defense strategy used by FPGA cloud services involves checking user-submitted designs for circuit structures that are known to aggressively consume power. Unfortunately, this approach is limited by an attacker’s ability to conceive new designs that defeat existing checkers. In this work, our contributions are twofold. We evaluate a variety of circuit power wasting techniques that typically are not flagged by design rule checks imposed by FPGA cloud computing vendors. The efficiencies of five power wasting circuits, including our new design, are evaluated in terms of power consumed per logic resource. We then show that the source of voltage attacks based on power wasters can be identified. Our monitoring approach localizes the attack and suppresses the clock signal for the target region within 21 μs, which is fast enough to stop an attack before it causes a board reset. All experiments are performed using a state-of-the-art Intel Stratix 10 FPGA.
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