Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians
Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians
复制标题
在对政治家的调查中找出说真话的偏好
DOI:
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
11.1
通讯作者:
A. Gallego
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. A. Janezic;A. Gallego
Significance Voters who would like to accurately evaluate the performance of politicians in office often rely on incomplete information and are uncertain whether politicians’ words can be trusted. Honesty is highly valued in politics because politicians who are averse to lying should in principle provide more trustworthy information. Despite the importance of honesty in politics, there is no scientific evidence on politicians’ lying aversion. We measured preferences for truth-telling in a sample of 816 elected politicians and study observable characteristics associated with honesty. We find that in our sample, politicians who are averse to lying have lower reelection rates, suggesting that honesty may not pay off in politics. Honesty is one of the most valued traits in politicians. Yet, because lies often remain undiscovered, it is difficult to study if some politicians are more honest than others. This paper examines which individual characteristics are correlated with truth-telling in a controlled setting in a large sample of politicians. We designed and embedded a game that incentivizes lying with a nonmonetary method in a survey answered by 816 Spanish mayors. Mayors were first asked how interested they were in obtaining a detailed report about the survey results, and at the end of the survey, they had to flip a coin to find out whether they would be sent the report. Because the probability of heads is known, we can estimate the proportion of mayors who lied to obtain the report. We find that a large and statistically significant proportion of mayors lied. Mayors that are members of the two major political parties lied significantly more. We further find that women and men were equally likely to lie. Finally, we find a negative relationship between truth-telling and reelection in the next municipal elections, which suggests that dishonesty might help politicians survive in office.
影响因子:
9.8
作者:
Abeler, Johannes;Becker, Anke;Falk, Armin
通讯作者:
Falk, Armin
影响因子:
3.6
作者:
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
通讯作者:
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska