Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
Long-term assessment of power capacity incentives by modeling generation investment dynamics under irreversibility and uncertainty
复制标题
通过对不可逆和不确定性下的发电投资动态建模来长期评估电力容量激励
DOI：
10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
Olsina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Festner;Blanco;Olsina
在实际的纯能源市场中，电力价格的高度波动影响了发电商的预期收益。因此，在处理不确定性下的不可逆性时，推迟新电厂的决策，等待更好的信息，是一种合理的方法。理论和经验证据表明，这种投资模式决定了建设周期的发生，这强烈危及供应安全。为了补充发电商的收入，在过去几年中制定了若干薪酬机制。沿着这条线，这项工作解决了长期的动态能力充足性和市场效率与基于价格和基于数量的能力报酬政策。为此，最近开发的随机模拟模型被用作基准。因此，发电投资的最优延迟决策集成到一个长期的电力市场模型，制定决策问题的框架下的真实的期权分析。结果表明，政策制定者可以交换供应安全（有效性）的能源价格由消费者支付（效率）时，设计和实施能力的报酬机制。通过这样做，本文有助于正在进行的辩论有关的激励政策和有效的电力市场的设计，考虑不可逆性和不确定性下的投资者的决策的微观经济学。
In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply security. In order to supplement generators' revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently-developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of generation investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors’ decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.
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DOI：
10.1109/pes.2010.5589365
发表时间：
2010-07
期刊：
IEEE PES General Meeting
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Eager;J. Bialek;T. Johnson
通讯作者：
D. Eager;J. Bialek;T. Johnson
DOI：
10.1109/tpas.1982.317321
发表时间：
1982
期刊：
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Caramanis
通讯作者：
M. Caramanis
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Longstaff, FA;Schwartz, ES
通讯作者：
Schwartz, ES
将实物期权分析与长期电力市场模型相结合
影响因子：
12.8
作者：
Festner;Blanco;Olsina
通讯作者：
Olsina
影响因子：
9
作者：
A. Abani;Nicolas Hary;V. Rious;M. Saguan
通讯作者：
A. Abani;Nicolas Hary;V. Rious;M. Saguan