Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central

Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central
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为什么扩展思维没什么特别但很重要

DOI:
10.1007/s11097-022-09827-5
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Ongaro G
Ongaro G
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ongaro G

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扩展心智理论认为心智并不局限于大脑,而是延伸到物质世界。围绕这一论题的哲学辩论主要集中在对认知人工制品的延伸上,将这一现象视为人类有机体的一种特殊能力,即招募外部物理资源来解决个人任务。本文认为,如果心灵延伸到人工制品在追求个人的任务,它延伸到其他人在追求集体的任务。心灵延伸到其他人本质上对应于认知的“我们模式”,人类心灵的独特力量共同指向目标,意图,事态或价值观(重要的是,不同于“群体心灵”)。由于集体意向性的能力在进化和发展中优先于人类-认识的人工制品关系,扩展的心灵不应被视为一种特殊现象,而应被视为人类状况的一个中心方面。最初的扩展心智理论对认知科学的发展具有重要的启示意义。在容纳集体意向性的命题版本中,这些含义将比最初假设的要深刻得多。
The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed.
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