Non-acceptance of Losses - An Experimental Study on the Importance of the Sign of Final Outcomes in Ultimatum Bargaining
Non-acceptance of Losses - An Experimental Study on the Importance of the Sign of Final Outcomes in Ultimatum Bargaining
复制标题
不接受损失——最后通牒谈判中最终结果符号重要性的实验研究
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-89920-6_39
复制
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Schosser
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Neumann;Schosser
Many real-life situations, e.g., budget allocation within universities or negotiations between insurance companies over compensation for damages, etc., highlight the relevance of distribution problems. In many corresponding situations, it is not only positive outcomes that need to be divided but also negative or combinations of positive and negative ones. Previous research typically focuses on distribution problems that emerge either in a gain or in a loss domain or on a comparison between the two domains. In this experimental study, we focused on the behavior of players in two modified versions of an ultimatum game that implemented asymmetric strategic advantages for the players, i.e., the game allowed for both, positive and negative overall payoffs for both players. We found that (1) the bargaining behavior of the proposers was in line with previous research findings, i.e., most proposers offered between 40 and 50% of the pie to the responder, and (2) the responders, in contrast to literature on gains or losses, oriented their behavior towards breaking-even. Their desire to break-even seemed to act as a stronger motive than their preference to secure an equal split.
DOI:
10.5282/ubm/epub.18175
发表时间:
2013-08
期刊:
Social & Political Philosophy eJournal
影响因子:
--
作者:
W. Güth;M. Kocher
通讯作者:
W. Güth;M. Kocher
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1993
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Colin Camerer;Eric J. Johnson;T. Rymon;Sankar Sen
通讯作者:
Sankar Sen