Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
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超模块化收益和目标下顺序信息设计的稳健实现
DOI:
10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
Hiroto Sato
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
小松聡浩;山内一貴;横山朝哉;Hiroto Sato
This paper studiessequential information design(Doval and Ely in Econometrica 88:2575–2608, 2020) in which a designer can construct the extensive form along with the information structure. In this framework, I investigate robust implementations against adversarial equilibrium selection, when players and the designer have a supermodular payoff function with dominant states and an outside option. The main results show that the optimal partially implementable outcome is fully implementable in sequential information design, which essentially coincides with the optimal partially implementable outcome in static information design. For economic applications such as global game of regime change, this paper proposes a way to robustly achieve the desired outcome in static information design by providing the extensive form and the information structure.
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DOI:
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发表时间:
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期刊:
Social Science Research Network
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期刊:
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