The Unequal Effects of Trade Liberalization: Theory and Evidence from India

The Unequal Effects of Trade Liberalization: Theory and Evidence from India
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贸易自由化的不平等效应:来自印度的理论和证据

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发表时间:
2004
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Burgess
R. Burgess
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作者:
Fabrizio Zilibotti;P. Aghion;R. Burgess

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本文的重点是印度最近的一次贸易自由化的影响。印度在1991年经历了一场大规模的改革,其中包括大幅削减关税和向外国直接投资开放不同的工业部门。在论文的一节中详细描述了这段插曲,从其规模和影响来看,这是一次有吸引力的实验,以评估该理论的有效性。更准确地说,我们使用三位数的行业、州和时间变化的“工业年度调查”(ASI)数据构建了1970年至1996年期间的三维面板。可获得的数据包括每个行业状态时间观察的增加值、资本、劳动力和利润。我们使用自由化前一段时间的每个工人的产出(相对于同年最具生产力的国有工业观察)作为一个特定三位数行业到前沿的距离的代理。我们将这个变量与1991年前为零的改革措施相互作用,并在1991年后取值为1,以检验改革前距离前沿的距离是否影响改革后的绩效。我们首先记录了改革对劳动生产率的影响,然后分别考虑了对全要素生产率、盈利性就业和投资的影响。这对该理论的第一个预测提供了检验,即越接近边界的公司对自由化带来的进入威胁的反应越大。其次,我们考虑了各州特定的劳动力市场监管。为此,我们使用了Besley和Burgess(2002)构建的劳工法规方向的衡量标准,该标准将《劳资纠纷法》的州修正案编码为支持劳工、中立或支持资本。这一变量在1991年的水平反映了工人和雇主在改革时刻的相对议价能力,然后与改革的假人交互作用,并用作劳动生产率、全要素生产率等单独回归的解释变量。这一交互作用项的估计系数提供了一个推断,即劳动法规在决定改革对国家工业绩效的影响方面是否重要。最后,我们考虑了距离前沿、劳动管制和改革之间的三个方面的互动关系,以检验管制对产业绩效的影响是否对更接近世界前沿的行业的影响更大。回归分析表明:(1)改革后,越接近技术前沿的国有工业实际制造业产出、劳动生产率、全要素生产率和租金(利润)的增长幅度越大。(2)有利于工人的劳动法规对相同变量的增长有负面影响,并且这种影响因自由化而加强。在控制了国家、行业和国家-行业固定效应加上时间假人之后,这两个结果都是正确的。稳健性检查包括增加对与改革假人互动的国家假人的控制,以表明结果是由于行业内的差异,正如理论所表明的那样。此外,添加特定于行业的时间趋势来考虑不同行业的不同融合模式不会改变结果。
This paper focuses on the effects of a recent episode of trade liberalization in India. India underwent a massive reform in 1991 which involved slashing tariffs and opening up different industrial sectors to foreign direct investment. This episode, which is described in detail in a section of the paper, represents, for its size and impact, an attractive experiment to assess the validity of the theory. More precisely, we construct a three-dimensional panel for the period 1970 to 1996 using "Annual Survey of Industries" (ASI) data with variations over 3-digit industry, state and time. The available data include value added, capital, labor and profits for each industry-state-time observation. We use a measure of output per worker in the period just before liberalization (relative to the most productive state-industry observation in the same year) as a proxy of the distance to frontier for a particular 3-digit industry. We interact this variable with a reform measure which is zero before 1991 and takes on a value of one thereafter to test whether the distance to frontier prior to reform influences the post-reform performance. We first document the effects of the reform on labor productivity, and then consider separately the effects on total factor productivity, profitability employment and investments. This provides a test of the first prediction of the theory, i.e., that firms closer to the frontier respond more to the threat of entry introduced by liberalization. Second, we consider state-specific labor market regulations. To this aim, we use a measure of the direction of labor regulation constructed by Besley and Burgess (2002), which coded state amendments to the Industrial Dispute Act as pro-labor, neutral or pro-capital. The level of this variable in 1991, which captures the relative bargaining powers of workers and employers at the moment of the reform, is then interacted with the dummy for the reform and used as an explanatory variable for separate regressions for labor productivity, TFP etc.. The estimated coefficient on this interaction term provides an inference on whether labor regulations mattered in determining the effect of the reform on state industrial performances. Finally, we consider the three way interaction between distance to frontier, labor regulation and reform to examine whether the impact of regulation on industrial performance is larger for industries that are closer to the world frontier. The regression analysis show that (i) state-industries that are closer to the technological frontier experienced larger increases in real manufacturing output, labor productivity, TFP and rents (profits) in the post-reform period. (ii) pro-worker labor regulations have a negative effect on the growth of the same variables, and this effect is strengthened by liberalization. Both results hold true after controlling for state, industry and state-industry fixed effects plus time dummies. Robustness checks include adding controls for state dummies interacted with the dummy for reform to show that the results are due, as the theory suggests, to variations within industries. Also, adding industry-specific time trends to account for different convergence patterns across industries does not change the results.
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3595
发表时间: 1998-03
期刊: Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子: --
作者:
R. Hall;C. I. Jones
通讯作者: R. Hall;C. I. Jones
DOI: 10.1086/654419
发表时间: 1999-05
影响因子: 7.7
作者:
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通讯作者: F. Rodríguez;D. Rodrik
DOI: 10.2307/2534573
发表时间: 1995
期刊: --
影响因子: --
作者:
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