The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation
The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation
复制标题
发展中国家银行监管的政治经济学:风险与声誉
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198841999.003.0005
复制
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Behuria P
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Behuria P
Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government has led the country through a remarkable economic recovery with annual GDP growth rates exceeding 6 per cent in most years. The RPF government’s economic strategy is to develop a service-based economy, which includes making Kigali (its capital) a hub of various kinds—from tourism to ICT—and also for finance. This differentiates Rwanda from the East Asian developmental states and another aspiring African developmental state (Ethiopia) where financial sectors have been largely under government control (or owned by local nationals)(Oqubay, 2015; Wade, 1990). With the aim of becoming a financial sector hub, the RPF government has transformed its financial sector—liberalizing it and recently committing to rapidly adopt and implement Basel II and III standards. Since Rwanda’s financial sector remains largely underdeveloped, the government’s exuberance for adopting and implementing the most recent international banking standards seems out of touch with the capacities and status of the country’s financial sector, also contradicting the aim of becoming a developmental state. In its position as a small country with limited resources, the RPF government has become an uncritical standard-taker in its financial sector. The government’s adoption of Basel standards signals a commitment to experimentation but highlights the prioritization of meeting (what they perceive as) best practices ahead of dealing with domestic contextual realities.This chapter argues that the RPF government’s adoption and proposed implementation of Basel banking standards is ‘policy-driven’convergence. Rwandan regulators have limited autonomy and leadership. Rwandan regulators support Basel adoption because it aligns with a broader economic objective (becoming a financial sector hub). Yet unlike dynamics in Ghana (another example of policy-driven convergence), the goal of implementing Basel standards is not a matter of political contention given that the dominant party (RPF) enjoys relatively uncontested authority. Rwanda’s economic leadership (the president and senior ministers) drives Basel implementation because it is perceived to be an
登录
查看更多内容
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2009
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
S. Ortiz
通讯作者:
S. Ortiz
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011-03
期刊:
European Economics: Macroeconomics & Monetary Economics eJournal
影响因子:
--
作者:
Rafael Repullo;Jesus Saurina Salas
通讯作者:
Rafael Repullo;Jesus Saurina Salas
DOI:
10.1142/s1793993310000044
发表时间:
2009
期刊:
Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal
影响因子:
--
作者:
Barry Eichengreen
通讯作者:
Barry Eichengreen
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Leonardo R. Arriola
通讯作者:
Leonardo R. Arriola
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Financial Stability Board
通讯作者:
Financial Stability Board