A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums
A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums
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参与法定人数的公投实验
作者：
Xinxin Ma;Takashi Oshio;Jun-ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi;長谷川 誠;Hizen Yoichi
本文进行了一项针对赞成/反对公投的实验室实验，其中只有当选民投票率高于预定水平时，结果才有效。有人认为，这样的参与法定人数会促使少数选民战略性地弃权，特别是当法定人数较多时。在我们的实验中，受试者在投票前被随机分为是和否两组，并且法定人数水平逐轮变化。我们观察到，（i）如果法定人数较少，则所有受试者都会参加投票；（ii）如果法定人数较多，则前多数群体中的受试者会去投票，而前少数群体中的受试者倾向于弃权。因此，如果法定人数较多，则经常会出现因投票率低而导致结果无效的情况。此外，当每次公投的主体数量增加时，前少数群体的主体会更积极地弃权，如果两个群体的预期成员数量相似，后少数群体就有获胜的空间。因此，如果政策制定者希望避免战略性弃权的可能性，那么我们的结果表明，他们应该不设定法定人数，或者只设定相对较小的法定人数，而大多数选民预计，这将与实际投票率相比相形见绌。如果政策制定者还关心投票率极低的情况下可能做出是或否的决定，以及战略性弃权，那么建议使用相对较小的法定人数。
This paper conducts a laboratory experiment focused on ayes/noreferendum in which the outcome is valid only if voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically in particular when the quorum is large. In our experiment, subjects are randomly divided into two groupsyesandnoin advance of voting, and the level of quorum changes round by round. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all subjects go to the polls, and (ii) if the quorum is large, subjects in theex‐antemajority group go to the polls, whereas subjects in theex‐anteminority group tend to abstain. As a result, if the quorum is large, it frequently happens that the outcome is rendered invalid because of low voter turnout. Furthermore, when the number of subjects in each referendum increases, subjects of theex‐anteminority abstain more aggressively, and there arises room for theex‐postminority to win if the expected number of members is similar between the two groups. Therefore, if policy makers would like to avoid the possibility of strategic abstention, then our results suggest that they should impose either no quorum or only a relatively small quorum which most voters expect will be dwarfed by the actual turnout. If policy makers also care about the possible determination of eitheryesornowith extremely low voter turnout, as well as strategic abstention, then a relatively small quorum is recommended.
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