Action-dependent commitment in vertical collaborations: The effect of demand-creating innovations in a supply chain
Action-dependent commitment in vertical collaborations: The effect of demand-creating innovations in a supply chain
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垂直合作中依赖行动的承诺：供应链中需求创造创新的影响
DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2020.102164
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发表时间：
2021-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rui Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zehui Ge;Qiying Hu;Chon-Huat Goh;Rui Zhao
最近采用的基于互联网的技术促进了商业伙伴之间的合作创新，其中包括战略承诺（例如，非正式沟通和正式合同）往往被用来科普高度不确定性。这种承诺能否减少不确定性，对公司是否有利可图？惩罚会阻碍机会主义行为吗？我们回答这些问题，通过调查行动依赖的承诺，在这里定义为当所有的承诺都在一定的顺序，在供应链中的合作创新的背景下。通过建立联盟成员间的多阶段博弈模型，分析了企业在研发和生产中的事前承诺和事后机会主义行为。首先，我们发现，行动依赖的承诺可以减少不确定性的负面影响，因为它提高了成员的努力和利润的意义上的期望以及供应链绩效。特别是，供应商更有动力投资于研发。第二，机会主义行为可能会受到一定程度的约束，但不是绝对的。第三，将供应商的外部订单控制在一定的水平之下有助于企业维持联盟的稳定性。在实践中，管理者可以采取行动依赖的承诺，以鼓励合作的R&D努力。此外，机会主义的存在，即使是最严厉的惩罚，意味着他们必须准备在某些极端情况下谨慎行事。最后，管理者必须认识到谁是供应链的领导者，因为只有这样的领导者，谁先采取行动，谁就能得到更多，谁就愿意投入更多。
The recent adoption of Internet-based technologies has boosted collaborative innovation between business partners, among which strategic commitments (e.g., informal communications and formal contracts) are often employed to cope with high uncertainty. Can such commitments reduce uncertainty and are they profitable for firms? Do penalties impede opportunistic behavior? We answer these questions by investigating action-dependent commitment, defined here as when all commitments are made in a certain sequence, in the context of collaborative innovation in a supply chain. Modeling a multi-stage game among the members of an alliance, we analyze firms’ ex-ante commitments and ex-post opportunistic behavior in R&D and production. First, we find that an action-dependent commitment can reduce the negative effects of uncertainty because it enhances both members’ efforts and profits in the sense of expectations as well as supply chain performance. In particular, the supplier is more incentivized to invest in R&D. Second, opportunistic behavior may be restrained to a certain extent, but not absolutely. Third, keeping the supplier’s outside orders below a certain level can help firms maintain the stability of the alliance. In practice, managers could adopt to make an action-dependent commitment to encourage collaborative R&D efforts. Moreover, the existence of opportunism, even with a maximal punishment, implies that they must be prepared to exercise caution in certain extreme cases. Finally, managers must recognize who is the chain’s leader for only such leaders who act first will get more and are willing to invest more.
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影响因子：
1.1
作者：
Margo Liik;J. Masso;K. Ukrainski
通讯作者：
Margo Liik;J. Masso;K. Ukrainski
DOI：
10.1111/deci.12484
发表时间：
2020-08
期刊：
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1090.1105
发表时间：
2010-02
期刊：
Manag. Sci.
影响因子：
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作者：
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