Product quality choice in two-echelon supply chains under post-sale liability: insights from wholesale price contracts
Product quality choice in two-echelon supply chains under post-sale liability: insights from wholesale price contracts
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售后责任下两级供应链的产品质量选择：来自批发价格合同的见解
DOI：
10.1080/00207543.2016.1240382
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发表时间：
2017-05
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Tang Xiaowo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fan Jianchang;Ni Debing;Tang Xiaowo
本文考虑了一个两级供应链，由上游制造商（M）和下游零售商（R）组成，后者通过批发价格合同交易中间产品。供应链为单位需求消费者提供良好的体验。 M对其产品处于低质量状态造成的损害承担责任。建立两阶段博弈模型来描述供应链如何运作。在均衡条件下，在一定的假设条件下，本文发现：（1）尽管售后产品责任对批发价格有正向影响，但M的质量水平、合同数量和供应链成员的盈利能力与其无关； （2）当责任相关因素和M的质量改进效率发生变化时，批发价格作为媒介，M和R共同分担事前预期责任成本、事前预期消费者损害造成的需求损失和事前质量改进成本； （3）针对负债相关因素的变化，M和R的质量绩效与财务绩效发生冲突，但当质量改进效率发生变化时，这种冲突消失。还讨论了管理见解。
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer (M) and a downstream Retailer (R) who transact intermediate products via a wholesale price contract. The supply chain provides an experience good to unit-demand consumers. M is liable for the harm caused by its products in a low quality state. A two-stage game model is built to describe how the supply chain operates. With the equilibrium and under certain assumptions, this paper finds that (1) in spite that post-sale product liability positively affects the wholesale price, M’s quality level, the contracted quantity and supply chain members’ profitability are independent of it; (2) when liability-related factors and M’s quality improvement efficiency change, the wholesale price serves as a medium for M and R to mutually share the ex ante expected liability cost, the demand loss caused by the ex ante expected consumer harm and the ex ante quality-improving cost; (3) in response to changes in liability-related factors, the quality performance is in conflict with the financial performance for both M and R, but this conflict disappears in the presence of a change in quality improvement efficiency. Managerial insights are also discussed.
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影响因子：
12
作者：
Xiande Zhao;Yina Li;Barbara B. Flynn
通讯作者：
Xiande Zhao;Yina Li;Barbara B. Flynn
影响因子：
12
作者：
Jingxian Chen;Liang Liang;Feng Yang
通讯作者：
Feng Yang
影响因子：
9.2
作者：
L. Forker;D. Méndez;J. Hershauer
通讯作者：
L. Forker;D. Méndez;J. Hershauer
影响因子：
3.4
作者：
A. Polinsky;S. Shavell
通讯作者：
A. Polinsky;S. Shavell
DOI：
10.1111/1467-6451.00171
发表时间：
2003-05
期刊：
Administrative Law
影响因子：
--
作者：
Nicholas G. Rupp;Curtis R. Taylor
通讯作者：
Nicholas G. Rupp;Curtis R. Taylor