An Anscombean Perspective on Habitual Action
An Anscombean Perspective on Habitual Action
复制标题
安斯科姆比对习惯行为的看法
DOI：
10.1007/s11245-019-09651-8
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Ometto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Kalis;D. Ometto
很多时候，人类似乎依赖于习惯。习惯是由环境线索直接引发的习得行为，对目标的短期变化不敏感：因此它们有时是非理性的。但是，即使习惯性反应是理性的（有助于当前目标的实现），它们似乎也不是出于某种原因而做出的。因为，根据对习惯行为的共同理解，行为人的意图在这种反应的发生中不起任何作用。本文讨论了在什么条件下我们可以说习惯性反应毕竟是有原因的。我们展示了习惯性行为不能被理解为“出于原因而行动”的想法是如何源于一个广泛但往往隐含的理论框架：行动的因果理论。然后，我们提出了一个替代方案，Anscombean的理解有意的行动，这可以解释习惯性的反应是做的原因。
Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational (contributing to current goal fulfillment), it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can say that habitual responses are, after all, done for reasons. We show how the idea that habitual behaviour cannot be understood as ‘acting for reasons’ stems from a widely but often implicitly held theoretical framework: the causal theory of action. We then propose an alternative, Anscombean understanding of intentional action, which can account for habitual responses being done for reasons.
影响因子：
3.5
作者：
Neal, David T.;Wood, Wendy;Lally, Phillippa
通讯作者：
Lally, Phillippa
影响因子：
0.5
作者：
Kietzmann Christian
通讯作者：
Kietzmann Christian