Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
复制标题
市场透明度、逆向选择和道德风险
DOI:
10.1086/688875
复制
发表时间:
2015
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Konrad Stahl
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tobias J;Christian Lambertz;Konrad Stahl
We study how an improvement in market transparency affects seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior in a market setting that involves informational asymmetries. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and staying but improving behavior—a reduction in moral hazard—they preferred the latter. Increasing market transparency led to better market outcomes.
登录
查看更多内容
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2008
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Corey Hilz
通讯作者:
Corey Hilz
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Luís M. B. Cabral
通讯作者:
Luís M. B. Cabral
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2014
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Chris Nosko;S. Tadelis
通讯作者:
S. Tadelis
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Aviva Aron;L. Einav;Amy N. Finkelstein;M. Cullen
通讯作者:
M. Cullen
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2013
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
L. Einav;Chiara Farronato;Jonathan Levin;Neel Sundaresan
通讯作者:
Neel Sundaresan