Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat
Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat
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为什么基于分歧的怀疑主义无法逃避自我挫败的挑战
DOI：
10.1017/epi.2019.14
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Grundmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas Grundmann
基于分歧的全球元哲学怀疑论面临着自我失败的问题，因为它削弱了其激励和解的原则。然而，怀疑论者可以通过采取广泛的元哲学怀疑论来轻松地逃避这种威胁，即认为我们的大多数哲学信仰都是不合理的，除了我们对认识论基本原则的信仰。正如我将在本文中论证的那样，这种怀疑论仍然对作为认知学科的哲学构成了根本性的挑战。此外，仍然广泛存在的非全球性怀疑主义也在损害自身。更深层次的原因是，这种更温和的怀疑主义只能受到这样一种假设的激励，即与哲学同行的分歧是大量的，我们只能依靠跟踪记录的论点来识别同行。但是，只有当一个人预先假定那些构成业绩评价基础的哲学信念是合理的，他才能为广泛的元哲学怀疑论辩护。在这里，自我挫败的威胁再次出现。我将首先针对来自文献的标准反对意见，为这一新的反怀疑论的前提进行辩护。第二，我将更详细地说明，在广泛的元哲学怀疑论的论证中，认识论的不一致性出现在哪里。
Global meta-philosophical skepticism based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting extensive meta-philosophical skepticism, i.e. the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism still poses a radical challenge to philosophy as a cognitive discipline. Moreover, non-global skepticism that is still extensive undermines itself as well. The deeper reason for this is that this more modest kind of skepticism can only be motivated by the assumption that disagreement with philosophical peers is abundant and that we can identify peers only by relying on track-record arguments. But then one can argue for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism only if one presupposes that those philosophical beliefs that form the basis of track-record evaluations are justified. Here, the threat of self-defeat looms again. I will proceed by first defending the premises of this new anti-skeptical argument against standard objections from the literature. Second, I will show in more detail where the epistemic inconsistency arises in the argument for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism.
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影响因子：
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DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
影响因子：
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