Surrogate Scoring Rules
Surrogate Scoring Rules
复制标题
替代评分规则
DOI:
10.1145/3391403.3399488
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Chen, Yiling
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Liu, Yang;Wang, Juntao;Chen, Yiling
Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) are incentive compatible for eliciting information about random variables from strategic agents when the principal can reward agents after the realization of the random variables. They also quantify the quality of elicited information, with more accurate predictions receiving higher scores in expectation. In this article, we extend such scoring rules to settings in which a principal elicits private probabilistic beliefs but only has access to agents’ reports. We name our solutionSurrogate Scoring Rules(SSR). SSR is built on a bias correction step and an error rate estimation procedure for a reference answer defined using agents’ reports. We show that, with a little information about the prior distribution of the random variables, SSR in a multi-task setting recover SPSR in expectation, as if having access to the ground truth. Therefore, a salient feature of SSR is that they quantify the quality of information despite the lack of ground truth, just as SPSR do for the settingwithground truth. As a by-product, SSR inducedominant uniform strategy truthfulnessin reporting. Our method is verified both theoretically and empirically using data collected from real human forecasters.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
Proceedings of the Ninth AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP 2021
影响因子:
--
作者:
Wang, Juntao;Liu, Yang;Chen, Yiling
通讯作者:
Chen, Yiling
影响因子:
7.2
作者:
Tetlock, Philip E.;Mellers, Barbara A.;Chen, Eva
通讯作者:
Chen, Eva
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10050
发表时间:
2016
期刊:
ArXiv
影响因子:
--
作者:
Rafael M. Frongillo;Jens Witkowski
通讯作者:
Jens Witkowski
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
影响因子:
--
作者:
Yuqing Kong
通讯作者:
Yuqing Kong
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
--
作者:
Yuqing Kong;G. Schoenebeck
通讯作者:
G. Schoenebeck