The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
复制标题
社会环境的近视稳定集
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3120456
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Seel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Herings;T. Demuynck;Riccardo D. Saulle;C. Seel
我们为联盟形成模型引入了一个新的解的概念，称为近视稳定集。近视稳定集是为一类非常普遍的社会环境定义的，并允许无限的状态空间。证明了近视稳定集的存在性和非空性。在次连续性条件下，我们还证明了唯一性。此外，近视稳定集是非合作博弈中的核心集和纯策略纳什均衡集的超集。此外，近视稳定集概括和统一了来自更具体环境的各种结果。特别地，如果联盟结构核心非空，则近视稳定集与联盟函数形式博弈中的联盟结构核心重合；与标准一对一匹配模型中的稳定匹配集重合；与网络形成模型中的两两稳定网络和闭合循环的集合重合；以及与有限超模博弈、有限势博弈和集聚博弈中的纯策略纳什均衡的集合重合。我们通过刻画具有不对称成本的Bertrand竞争模型中的短视稳定集来说明我们概念的多功能性，对于该模型，到目前为止，文献还不能完全刻画所有(混合)纳什均衡的集合。
We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor continuity conditions, we also demonstrate uniqueness. Furthermore, the myopic stable set is a superset of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. Additionally, the myopic stable set generalizes and unifies various results from more specific environments. In particular, the myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite supermodular games, finite potential games, and aggregative games. We illustrate the versatility of our concept by characterizing the myopic stable set in a model of Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs, for which the literature so far has not been able to fully characterize the set of all (mixed) Nash equilibria.
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
M. Chwe
通讯作者：
M. Chwe
A. Tamura：“从任意匹配到稳定匹配的转变”组合理论杂志，A 系列。
DOI：
--
发表时间：
--
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
通讯作者：
--
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KANDORI, M;MAILATH, GJ;ROB, R
通讯作者：
ROB, R