The market, competition, and structural exploitation
The market, competition, and structural exploitation
复制标题
市场、竞争和结构性开发
DOI:
10.1111/1467-8675.12443
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
Hannes Kuch
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hannes Kuch
This article claims that the institution of the market is structurally exploitative. It allows for exploitation, it encourages actors to engage in it and it even pressurizes them to do so. Within Marxism, this claim is well known, but can it be defended without strongly relying on Marxist concepts and arguments? I will answer in the affirmative and identify the forces of market competition to be a fundamental source of exploitative pressures. By the market, I mean the social sphere that secures economic transactions through property rights and private contracts, and which, in its modern form, is characterized by a complex division of labor, a certain degree of competition between multiple sellers and buyers, and in which the majority of the population depends on market income. To link exploitation—that is, taking unfair advantage of others—systematically to the institution of the market is certainly highly contested. One prominent argument against the exploitation thesis is that the market grants its participants sufficient latitude to refrain from exploitative pressures. Arneson (2011, pp. 213–214), for example, argues that “the ‘market’does not block people engaged in exchange from softening the terms of exchange in the direction of egalitarian sharing.” Another line of argument objects that although the force of competition is operative in the market, competition is a “force for the good in society”(Dietsch, 2010, p. 223), as it allegedly eliminates ever more opportunities for exploitation rather than pushing actors to engage in it. Embraced by many contemporary philosophies of market exploitation (Miller, 1989; Wertheimer, 1996; Zwolinski, 2010), this is the basic thrust of neoclassical economics. A third position, stemming from the social philosophy of the market, criticizes this latter perspective as a fallacious idealization of the market but in the end, it effectively arrives at surprisingly similar results. Here, the argument, from Durkheim (1893/2013) to Etzioni (1988), is that economic theory usually abstracts from the sociality of the market by presupposing isolated, purely strategically oriented utility maximizers at its core. In reality, however, markets are always embedded in social and moral norms that endow economic actors with significant moral capacities, enabling them to refrain from exploitation even where there is an opportunity for it. As a prominent advocate of this position, Honneth concedes that market actors may use the market “to cheat, to pile on wealth and exploit others”
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影响因子:
0.7
作者:
Hannes Kuch
通讯作者:
Hannes Kuch
影响因子:
0.8
作者:
M. Reiff
通讯作者:
M. Reiff
影响因子:
2.2
作者:
N. Vrousalis
通讯作者:
N. Vrousalis
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2016
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Timo Jütten
通讯作者:
Timo Jütten
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
N. Vrousalis
通讯作者:
N. Vrousalis