Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection
Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection
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法兰克福式案例与道德责任:方法论反思
DOI:
10.1080/09672559.2021.1924226
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
0.6
通讯作者:
Ota Koji
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
徳岡 三紀;佐藤 ゆたか;Ota Koji
Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus denied the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers.
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影响因子:
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DOI:
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