Does Collective Wage Bargaining Restore Efficiency in a Search Model with Large Firms?

Does Collective Wage Bargaining Restore Efficiency in a Search Model with Large Firms?
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集体工资谈判能否恢复大公司搜索模型的效率?

DOI:
10.1111/ecoj.12073
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发表时间:
2014
期刊:
Macroeconomics: Employment
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Lingens
Lingens
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Christian;Lingens

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现有的搜索和谈判模型表明,企业雇用大量工人的效率低下。我们要问的是,分散的集体工资谈判是否会导致次优分配。集体谈判恢复效率时,讨价还价的工资是独立的就业;条件,我们反对。然后,公司的行为就好像集体谈判是在工资和就业,从而将大公司的搜索和谈判环境与有效的谈判模型联系起来(McDonald和Solow,1981)。在更现实的条件下,工人可以为产出的一部分讨价还价,因此工资是就业的函数。在均衡状态下,企业规模过大,企业进入效率低下。
Existing search and bargaining models show that firms hire an inefficiently large number of workers. We ask whether decentralised collective wage bargaining may result in a second‐best allocation. Collective bargaining restores efficiency when the bargained wage is independent of employment; conditions that we characterise. Firms then behave as if collective bargaining was over both wages and employment, thus linking the large‐firm search and bargaining environment to the efficient bargaining model (McDonald and Solow, 1981). Under more realistic conditions, workers can bargain for a share of output, so that the wage is then a function of employment. In equilibrium, firms are too large and firm entry is inefficient.
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