Challenging the Security of Logic Locking Schemes in the Era of Deep Learning: A Neuroevolutionary Approach
Challenging the Security of Logic Locking Schemes in the Era of Deep Learning: A Neuroevolutionary Approach
复制标题
挑战深度学习时代逻辑锁定方案的安全性:神经进化方法
DOI:
10.1145/3431389
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Leupers
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Dominik Sisejkovic;Farhad Merchant;Lennart M. Reimann;Harshit Srivastava;Ahmed Hallawa;R. Leupers
Logic locking is a prominent technique to protect the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit design and fabrication flow. However, in recent years, the security of locking schemes has been thoroughly challenged by the introduction of various deobfuscation attacks. As in most research branches, deep learning is being introduced in the domain of logic locking as well. Therefore, in this article we present SnapShot, a novel attack on logic locking that is the first of its kind to utilize artificial neural networks to directly predict a key bit value from a locked synthesized gate-level netlist without using a golden reference. Hereby, the attack uses a simpler yet more flexible learning model compared to existing work. Two different approaches are evaluated. The first approach is based on a simple feedforward fully connected neural network. The second approach utilizes genetic algorithms to evolve more complex convolutional neural network architectures specialized for the given task. The attack flow offers a generic and customizable framework for attacking locking schemes using machine learning techniques. We perform an extensive evaluation of SnapShot for two realistic attack scenarios, comprising both reference combinational and sequential benchmark circuits as well as silicon-proven RISC-V core modules. The evaluation results show that SnapShot achieves an average key prediction accuracy of 82.60% for the selected attack scenario, with a significant performance increase of 10.49 percentage points compared to the state of the art. Moreover, SnapShot outperforms the existing technique on all evaluated benchmarks. The results indicate that the security foundation of common logic locking schemes is built on questionable assumptions. Based on the lessons learned, we discuss the vulnerabilities and potentials of logic locking uncovered by SnapShot. The conclusions offer insights into the challenges of designing future logic locking schemes that are resilient to machine learning attacks.
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DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
DAC 2019
影响因子:
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作者:
Kamali, Hadi Mardani;Zamiri Azar, Kimia;Homayoun, Houman;Sasan, Avesta
通讯作者:
Sasan, Avesta
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
IEEE Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
影响因子:
--
作者:
Alaql, Abdulrahman;Forte, Domenic;Bhunia, Swarup
通讯作者:
Bhunia, Swarup
DOI:
10.1145/3338508.3359576
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ASHES'19: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security Workshop
影响因子:
--
作者:
Zhang, Yuqiao;Cui, Pinchen;Zhou, Ziqi;Guin, Ujjwal
通讯作者:
Guin, Ujjwal
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
影响因子:
--
作者:
Shakya, Bicky;Xu, Xiaolin;Tehranipoor, Mark;Forte, Domenic
通讯作者:
Forte, Domenic