Optimal Public Expenditure with Inefficient Unemployment

Optimal Public Expenditure with Inefficient Unemployment
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最优公共支出与低效率失业

DOI:
10.1093/restud/rdy030
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Michaillat P
Michaillat P
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Michaillat P

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本文提出了一个失业无效率时的最优公共支出理论。该理论基于匹配模型。最优公共支出偏离萨缪尔森规则,以减少失业差距(当前失业率与有效失业率之差)。这种最佳的“刺激支出”可以用一个公式来描述,该公式用三个充分的统计数据来表示:失业差距、失业乘数(通过增加公共支出实现的失业率下降)以及公共和私人消费之间的替代弹性。当失业率高而乘数为正时,该公式得出以下结果。(1)最优刺激支出是积极的,并在失业缺口增加。(2)最优刺激支出在乘数为零时为零,乘数较小时增加,乘数适中时最大,乘数超过乘数时减少。(3)如果额外的公共产品没有价值,最优刺激支出为零,随着替代弹性的增加,它会变得更大,如果额外的公共产品和额外的私人产品一样有价值,它会完全填补失业缺口。
This article proposes a theory of optimal public expenditure when unemployment is inefficient. The theory is based on a matching model. Optimal public expenditure deviates from the Samuelson rule to reduce the unemployment gap (the difference between current and efficient unemployment rates). Such optimal “stimulus spending” is described by a formula expressed with three sufficient statistics: the unemployment gap, the unemployment multiplier (the decrease in unemployment achieved by increasing public expenditure), and the elasticity of substitution between public and private consumption. When unemployment is inefficiently high and the multiplier is positive, the formula yields the following results. (1) Optimal stimulus spending is positive and increasing in the unemployment gap. (2) Optimal stimulus spending is zero for a zero multiplier, increasing in the multiplier for small multipliers, largest for a moderate multiplier, and decreasing in the multiplier beyond that. (3) Optimal stimulus spending is zero if extra public goods have no value, it becomes larger as the elasticity of substitution increases, and it completely fills the unemployment gap if extra public goods are as valuable as extra private goods.
DOI: 10.2307/2951568
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