A Reply to Cook and Oreskes on Climate Science Consensus Messaging
A Reply to Cook and Oreskes on Climate Science Consensus Messaging
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对库克和奥雷斯克斯关于气候科学共识消息的回复
DOI：
10.1080/17524032.2017.1392109
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Pearce W
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文献类型：
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作者：
Pearce W
在对我们论文的回复中（Pearce et al., 2017）， Cook（2017）和Oreskes（2017）都同意我们的中心观点：审议和动员应对气候变化的政策需要超越公众对科学共识的信念。然而，他们都继续捍卫共识信息，要么是因为“忽视传达科学共识的危险”（库克，2017年，第1页），要么是因为“‘没有共识’……仍然……是一个相反的谈话点”（奥雷斯克斯，2017年，第1页）。两者都强调了化石燃料公司之前进行的市场研究，这些研究表明，科学的不确定性为对抗监管提供了政治武器，并得出结论认为，公众对科学共识的错误看法削弱了对政策行动的支持（Oreskes, 2017，第2页）。奇怪的是，学者们接受企业研究作为知识和决策之间关系的证据，而我们评论中引用的学术证据却提供了许多相反的例子。Grundmann和Stehr（2012）研究了有关科学信息与政策（包括气候政策）之间关系的文献，发现对有效政策最重要的是识别和使用行动杠杆，如税收、监管、激励或公共投资，而不是科学共识。民意数据也让人怀疑共识信息的重要性。在表1中，我们总结了2017年美国公众态度和知识的相关全国调查数据（Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 2017; Marlon, Fine, & Leiserowitz, 2017）。尽管人们应该谨慎解读此类调查，但数据显示了美国人明确的多数立场：气候变化是真实的、重要的、令人担忧的，美国应该采取政策行动，投资于公共教育。这些立场是在缺乏关于科学共识的准确知识的情况下达成的。这里几乎没有证据支持库克、奥雷斯克斯和各种化石燃料公司的共同观点：关于科学共识的虚假信息会引发公众对政策的反对。尽管有这些证据，Cook（2017）和Oreskes（2017）似乎相信，公众对科学共识的理解对于制定有效的气候政策至关重要。即使这种“门户信念模型”可以在实验室研究中得到证明，1它在现实世界中具有可疑的意义，因为竞争信息的来源总是存在的（Kahan & Carpenter, 2017）。科学本身为这种差异提供了肥沃的土壤，正如目前的两个例子所证明的那样。首先，关于全球气温上升中断/暂停的争论不是由化石燃料利益引起的，而是一个真正的科学分歧的主题（Medhaug, Stolpe, Fischer, & Knutti, 2017）。其次，关于在保持全球气温上升低于1.5℃的情况下可以排放多少二氧化碳，专家们的争论越来越多（Millar等人，2017a, 2017b; Peters, 2017; Rathi, 2017）。对于气候科学家来说，在这些问题上没有明显的共识。另一方面
In their replies to our paper (Pearce et al., 2017), both Cook (2017) and Oreskes (2017) agree with our central point: that deliberating and mobilizing policy responses to climate change requires thinking beyond public belief in a scientific consensus. However, they both continue to defend consensus messaging, either because of “the dangers of neglecting to communicate the scientific consensus”(Cook, 2017, p. 1) or because “‘no consensus’… remains… a contrarian talking point”(Oreskes, 2017, p. 1). Both highlight previously conducted market research by fossil fuel companies which suggested that scientific uncertainty provided a political weapon in fighting regulation, concluding that incorrect public perceptions of the scientific consensus weaken support for policy action (Oreskes, 2017, p. 2). It is odd that scholars accept corporate research as proof of a claim about the relation between knowledge and decision-making, when the academic evidence cited in our Commentary provides numerous examples to the contrary. Grundmann and Stehr (2012) examined the literature regarding the relation between scientific information and policies (including climate policy), finding that what matters most for effective policy is the identification, and use, of levers for action such as taxes, regulation, incentives or public investment, not scientific consensus. Public opinion data also cast doubt on the importance of consensus messaging. In Table 1, we summarize relevant 2017 national survey data of US public attitudes and knowledge (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 2017; Marlon, Fine, & Leiserowitz, 2017). Although one should be cautious interpreting such surveys, the data shows a clear majority position among Americans: that climate change is real, important and worrisome, and that the US should take policy action and invest in public education. These positions have been reached in the absence of accurate knowledge about the scientific consensus. There is little evidence here that supports the notion shared by Cook, Oreskes and various fossil fuel companies: that disinformation about scientific consensus begets public opposition to policy.Despite this evidence, Cook (2017) and Oreskes (2017) appear convinced that public understanding of scientific consensus is essential for developing effective climate polices. Even if this “gateway belief model” could be proved in laboratory studies, 1 it holds questionable significance in the real world where sources of competing information always exist (Kahan & Carpenter, 2017). Science itself provides fertile ground for such discrepancies, as two current examples demonstrate. First, the debate over the hiatus/pause in global temperature increase was not invented by fossil fuel interests, but is a subject of genuine scientific disagreement (Medhaug, Stolpe, Fischer, & Knutti, 2017). Second, there is increasing expert debate regarding how much carbon dioxide can be emitted while keeping global temperature rise below 1.5 C (Millar et al., 2017a, 2017b; Peters, 2017; Rathi, 2017). For climate scientists, there is no obvious consensus about questions such as these. On the other
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DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
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DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
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当怀疑成为武器
影响因子：
64.8
作者：
B. Wynne
通讯作者：
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库克对“超越气候共识”的回应
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
J. Cook
通讯作者：
J. Cook