Dynamic Mechanism Design: Robustness and Endogenous Types
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Robustness and Endogenous Types
复制标题
动态机制设计：鲁棒性和内生类型
DOI：
10.1017/9781108227162.001
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
A. Pavan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Pavan
这篇文章是为在2015年世界经济学协会的邀请会议上做好了准备的。 ：鲁棒性和内生类型。在（随着时间的时间上）的环境中，例如（a）向代理商提供私人和公共物品，因为他们的偏好或学习和实验会随着时间的推移而演变而来（b）当公司成本随着过去的投资而发展时，多周期采购拍卖的设计； -by- doing，（d）通过私人互动会随着时间的推移而逐渐学习的代理人的匹配。 ，收益通常是在初始签约时预计的，尽管当事方很少共同观察到，最佳的长期合同必须灵活地适应此类更改，同时为当事方提供了分享的动机他们会随着时间的推移而获得的信息。尤其是在福利最大化的福利中，利润最大化的动力如何？ ”（即，在签署最初合同之后对环境的变化都没有作用？
This article was prepared for an invited session at the 2015 World Congress of the Econometric Society. Through a unifying framework, I survey recent developments in the dynamic mechanism design literature and then introduce two new areas that I expect will draw attention in the years to come: robustness and endogenous types. INTRODUCTION Long-term contracting plays an important role in a variety of economic problems including trade, employment, regulation, taxation, and finance. Most long-term relationships take place in a “ changing world ,” that is, in an environment that evolves (stochastically) over time. Think, for example, of (a) the provision of private and public goods to agents whose valuations evolve over time, as the result of shocks to their preferences or learning and experimentation, (b) the design of multi-period procurement auctions when firms’ costs evolve as the result of past investments, (c) the design of optimal tax codes when workers’ productivity evolves over time as the result of changes in technology or because of learning-by-doing, (d) the matching of agents whose values and attractiveness is learned gradually over time through private interactions. Changes to the environment (either due to exogenous shocks, or to the gradual resolution of uncertainty about constant, but unknown, payoffs) are often anticipated at the time of initial contracting, albeit rarely jointly observed by the parties. By implication, optimal long-term contracts must be flexible to accommodate such changes, while at the same time provide the parties with incentives to share the information they receive over time. Understanding the properties of optimal long-term contracts is important both for positive and for normative analysis. It permits one to address questions such as: How does the provision of quantity/quality evolve over time under profit-maximizing contracts? How do the dynamics of the allocations under profit maximization compare to their counterparts under welfare maximization? In particular, when do distortions due to profit maximization decrease over time and vanish in the long run? In what environments does the private observability of the “shocks” (i.e., the changes to the environment subsequent to the signing of the initial contract) play no role? When is the nature of the shocks (i.e., whether they are transitory or permanent) relevant for the dynamics of the decisions under optimal contracts?
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdq033
发表时间：
2011-07
期刊：
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子：
--
作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
通讯作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.016
发表时间：
2015-09
期刊：
J. Econ. Theory
影响因子：
--
作者：
Mustafa Akan;B. Ata;James D Dana
通讯作者：
Mustafa Akan;B. Ata;James D Dana
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdv003
发表时间：
2015-04
期刊：
The Review of Economic Studies
影响因子：
--
作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
通讯作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz