Neo-pragmatism and enactive intentionality
Neo-pragmatism and enactive intentionality
复制标题
新实用主义和主动意向性
DOI:
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发表时间:
2012
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Katsunori Miyahara
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Gallagher;Katsunori Miyahara
Enactive approaches in cognitive science propose that perception, and more generally cognitive experience, are strongly mediated by embodied (sensory–motor) processes, and that our primary experience of the world is action-oriented or pragmatic (Noe, 2004; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). Extended mind theorists propose that cognition supervenes on embodied and environmental processes such as gestures and the use of various technologies (Clark, 2008; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2010). Both enactive and extended conceptions of cognition suggest that the mind is not “in the head”–that cognitive processes are distributed over brain, body, and environment – but they also differ on a number of issues. Extended mind theorists defend a functionalist account of cognition and downplay the role of the body (e.g., Clark, 2008), and they argue that cognition and action can involve mental representations (e.g., Clark, 1997; Clark and Grush, 1999; Rowlands, 2006; Wheeler, 2005). In contrast, enactive theorists argue for radical embodiment (e.g., Thompson and Varela, 2001) and defend an antirepresentationalist view (e.g., Gallagher, 2008b; Hutto, in press; Thompson, 2007). There are also debates about how to define the boundaries, or lack of boundaries, involved in cognitive processes (e.g., Di Paolo, 2009; Wheeler, 2008).
影响因子:
1.4
作者:
Gallagher, S;Meltzoff, AN
通讯作者:
Meltzoff, AN
影响因子:
4
作者:
Song HJ;Baillargeon R
通讯作者:
Baillargeon R