The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.

The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.
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DOI:
10.1037/rev0000343
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发表时间:
2022-04
影响因子:
5.4
通讯作者:
Melkonyan, Tigran
Melkonyan, Tigran
中科院分区:
心理学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chater, Nick;Zeitoun, Hossam;Melkonyan, Tigran

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社会互动是普遍存在的,也是理解人类行为的核心。我们认为,这种互动取决于共同的意向性:各方必须对模糊的互动形成共同的理解(例如,一个人向另一个人赠送礼物,要求双方都意识到所有权的自愿转移是有意的)。然而,共享的意向性是如何产生的呢?许多关于社会认知的著名解释,包括那些涉及“读心术”的解释,通常都陷入了循环和/或倒退。例如,A的信念和行为可能取决于她对B的信念和行为的预测,但B的信念和行为又取决于她对A的信念和行为的预测。一种可能性是接受循环,并将共享意向性作为对信念和行为施加一致性条件的条件,但通常有许多可能的解决方案,并且没有明确的标准来选择它们。我们认为,解决这些挑战需要某种形式的“我们”推理,但这引起了集体代理(“我们”)如何从个体代理产生的难题。这个难题可以通过提出集体代理人的意愿来自于一个模拟的讨价还价过程来解决:代理人必须推断出他们会同意什么,如果他们能够沟通的话。这个模型解释了共同的意图是如何形成的,以及哪些共同的意图是形成的。我们还提出,这种“虚拟讨价还价”可能是理解社会互动的基础。
Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g., one person giving a present to another requires that both parties appreciate that a voluntary transfer of ownership is intended). Yet how can shared intentionality arise? Many well-known accounts of social cognition, including those involving “mind-reading,” typically fall into circularity and/or regress. For example, A’s beliefs and behavior may depend on her prediction of B’s beliefs and behavior, but B’s beliefs and behavior depend in turn on her prediction of A’s beliefs and behavior. One possibility is to embrace circularity and take shared intentionality as imposing consistency conditions on beliefs and behavior, but typically there are many possible solutions and no clear criteria for choosing between them. We argue that addressing these challenges requires some form of we-reasoning, but that this raises the puzzle of how the collective agent (the “we”) arises from the individual agents. This puzzle can be solved by proposing that the will of the collective agent arises from a simulated process of bargaining: agents must infer what they would agree, were they able to communicate. This model explains how, and which, shared intentions are formed. We also propose that such “virtual bargaining” may be fundamental to understanding social interactions.
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