Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation
Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation
复制标题
社会规范、代价高昂的惩罚和合作的演变
DOI:
10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
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发表时间:
2016-10
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Shuheng Chen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tongkui Yu;Honggang Li;Shuheng Chen
Within a co-evolutionary framework of reputations, strategies and social norms, we study the role of punishment in the promotion of cooperation. Norms differ according to whether they allow or do not allow the punishment action to be a part of the strategies, and, in the case of the former, they further differ in terms of whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. In such a framework, depending on the applied social norm, players are first given different reputations based on their employed strategies. Players then update their strategies accordingly after they observe the payoff differences among different strategies. Finally, over a longer horizon, the evolution of the social norms may be driven by the average payoffs of all members of the society. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of the cooperative evolutionary stable state become larger, but the speed of convergence to the CESS also becomes faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm.
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DOI:
10.1353/book.3378
发表时间:
1884-07
期刊:
Edinburgh Medical Journal
影响因子:
--
作者:
A. Dickson
通讯作者:
A. Dickson
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0012
发表时间:
2012
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
作者:
S. J. Hadlich
通讯作者:
S. J. Hadlich
影响因子:
64.8
作者:
Robert M. May
通讯作者:
Robert M. May
影响因子:
2.3
作者:
Oosterbeek, H;Sloof, R;Van de Kuilen, G
通讯作者:
Van de Kuilen, G
影响因子:
36.8
作者:
Mauro Santos;E. Szathmáry
通讯作者:
Mauro Santos;E. Szathmáry