Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis
Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis
复制标题
推动税务合规：荟萃分析
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zareh Asatryan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Armenak Antinyan;Zareh Asatryan
各国政府越来越多地使用税收合规推动措施，因为它们被认为在增加税收方面具有成本效益。我们从45个随机对照试验中收集了大约1000个治疗效果评估，并使用荟萃分析方法合成了这些快速增长的文献。我们表明，针对个人税收士气因素的干预措施在遏制逃税方面平均无效(当与接受中性沟通的纳税人对照组进行评估时)。相比之下，威慑推动--强调审计概率和惩罚率等传统合规决定因素的干预措施--会增加合规。然而，它们的影响不大，使遵守的可能性比不具威慑力的微调高1.5至2.5个百分点。我们的额外结果表明，催促：一)对延迟付款者的子样本和当面提供时效果更好，二)在长期和低收入国家效果较差，三)选择性报告结果在某种程度上夸大了效果。
Tax compliance nudges are used increasingly by governments because of their perceived cost-effectiveness in raising tax revenue. We collect about a thousand treatment effect estimates from 45 randomized controlled trials, and synthesize this rapidly growing literature using meta-analytical methods. We show that interventions pointing to elements of individual tax morale are on average ineffective in curbing tax evasion (when evaluated against a control group of taxpayers receiving neutral communication). In contrast, deterrence nudges - interventions emphasizing traditional determinants of compliance such as audit probabilities and penalty rates - increase compliance. However, their effects are modest in magnitude increasing the probability of compliance by 1.5-2.5 percentage points more than non-deterrence nudges. Our additional results suggest that nudges i) work better on sub-samples of late payers and when delivered in-person, ii) are less effective in the long-run and in lower-income countries, and iii) are somewhat inflated by selective reporting of results.
发展中国家的财产税：来自墨西哥的理论和证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Brockmeyer A
通讯作者：
Brockmeyer A
影响因子：
2.3
作者：
Alm, James;Malezieux, Antoine
通讯作者：
Malezieux, Antoine
影响因子：
10.7
作者：
Andrews, Isaiah;Kasy, Maximilian
通讯作者：
Kasy, Maximilian