A Multi-server ORAM Framework with Constant Client Bandwidth Blowup
A Multi-server ORAM Framework with Constant Client Bandwidth Blowup
复制标题
具有恒定客户端带宽爆炸的多服务器 ORAM 框架
DOI:
10.1145/3369108
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发表时间:
2020
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Guajardo, Jorge
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hoang, Thang;Yavuz, Attila A.;Guajardo, Jorge
Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) allows a client to hide the access pattern when accessing sensitive data on a remote server. It is known that there exists a logarithmic communication lower bound on any passive ORAM construction, where the server only acts as the storage service. This overhead, however, was shown costly for some applications. Several active ORAM schemes with server computation have been proposed to overcome this limitation. However, they mostly rely on costly homomorphic encryptions, whose performance is worse than passive ORAM. In this article, we propose S3ORAM, a new multi-server ORAM framework, which featuresO(1) client bandwidth blowup and low client storage without relying on costly cryptographic primitives. Our key idea is to harness Shamir Secret Sharing and a multi-party multiplication protocol on applicable binary tree-ORAM paradigms. This strategy allows the client to instruct the server(s) to perform secure and efficient computation on his/her behalf with a low intervention thereby, achieving a constant client bandwidth blowup and low server computational overhead. Our framework can also work atop a generalk-ary tree ORAM structure (k≥ 2). We fully implemented our framework, and strictly evaluated its performance on a commodity cloud platform (Amazon EC2). Our comprehensive experiments confirmed the efficiency of S3ORAM framework, where it is approximately 10× faster than the most efficient passive ORAM (i.e., Path-ORAM) for a moderate network bandwidth while being three orders of magnitude faster than active ORAM withO(1) bandwidth blowup (i.e., Onion-ORAM). We have open-sourced the implementation of our framework for public testing and adaptation.
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影响因子:
22.7
作者:
SHAMIR, A
通讯作者:
SHAMIR, A
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2014
期刊:
International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public Key Cryptography
影响因子:
--
作者:
Daniel Apon;Jonathan Katz;E. Shi;Aishwarya Thiruvengadam
通讯作者:
Aishwarya Thiruvengadam
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_16
发表时间:
2015
期刊:
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
影响因子:
--
作者:
Sky Faber;Stanislaw Jarecki;S. Kentros;Boyang Wei
通讯作者:
Boyang Wei
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
影响因子:
--
作者:
T;Jonathan Katz;Kartik Nayak;Antigoni Polychroniadou;E. Shi
通讯作者:
E. Shi
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public Key Cryptography
影响因子:
--
作者:
Ittai Abraham;Christopher W. Fletcher;Kartik Nayak;Benny Pinkas;Ling Ren
通讯作者:
Ling Ren