Distinguishing topological and causal explanation

Distinguishing topological and causal explanation
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区分拓扑解释和因果解释

DOI:
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Lauren N. Ross
Lauren N. Ross
中科院分区:
人文科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Lauren N. Ross

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最近的哲学研究探索了因果和非因果解释形式之间的区别。在这些文献中,拓扑解释被视为非因果多样性的一个明显例子——它声称拓扑缺乏因果结构所必需的时间信息(Pincock In Mathematics and science representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Huneman In Synthese 177:213-245, 2010)。本文探讨了拓扑形式和因果形式的解释之间的区别,并认为这种区别并不像文献所表明的那样明确。其中一个原因是,一些解释既涉及拓扑信息,也涉及因果信息。在这些“边缘”情况下,科学家通过吸引兴趣系统的因果拓扑来解释一些结果。这些案例有助于澄清一种拓扑解释,这种解释是真正的因果关系,但不同于标准的拓扑和干预主义解释(伍德沃德在《使事情发生》中,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2003年)。
Recent philosophical work has explored the distinction between causal and non-causal forms of explanation. In this literature, topological explanation is viewed as a clear example of the non-causal variety–it is claimed that topology lacks temporal information, which is necessary for causal structure (Pincock in Mathematics and scientic representation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Huneman in Synthese 177:213–245, 2010). This paper explores the distinction between topological and causal forms of explanation and argues that this distinction is not as clear cut as the literature suggests. One reason for this is that some explanations involve both topological and causal information. In these “borderline” cases scientists explain some outcome by appealing to the causal topology of the system of interest. These cases help clarify a type of topological explanation that is genuinely causal, but that differs from standard topological and interventionist accounts of explanation (Woodward in Making things happen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).
生物学中的因果概念:途径与机制有何不同及其重要性
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy078
发表时间: 2021
期刊: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
影响因子: --
作者:
Ross, Lauren N.
通讯作者: Ross, Lauren N.
柯尼斯堡的七座桥。
DOI: 10.1097/aln.0b013e318210f580
发表时间: 2011
期刊: Anesthesiology
影响因子: 8.8
作者:
Pryor,KaneO;Sleigh,Jamie
通讯作者: Sleigh,Jamie