Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment
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竞争环境中信息获取的时机

DOI:
10.1002/nav.21677
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发表时间:
2016-02
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Chen Ying-Ju
Chen Ying-Ju
中科院分区:
管理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Guan Xu;Chen Ying-Ju

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本文研究了双头垄断市场中时机因素对卖方信息获取策略的影响。市场的不确定性是由一个代表性的消费者捕捉到的,这个消费者对产品的横向属性有着私人的喜好,两个卖家都可以在观察自己的产品质量之前(事前收购)或之后(事后收购)获得这些信息。我们确定了几个相互冲突的影响,信息获取的时间和市场特征有很大的不同。在垄断情况下,信息获取无疑是有益的,事前获取是主要的选择,因为它不仅可以帮助卖方设计合适的产品,还可以制定更好的定价策略。相反,当存在竞争时,信息获取消除了市场不确定性的缓冲作用,并导致最激烈的生产或定价竞争,这使得收购的后续影响是有害的,卖方的收益是非单调的收购成本。此外,与事前信息获取相比,事后信息获取通过推迟信息获取时机和保持产品差异化,通常会产生更高的卖方均衡收益。尽管如此,事后信息获取也为卖方提供了更大的获取激励,偶尔会使他比事前情况下更糟糕。因此,在竞争环境中,拥有获取信息的选择权和获取信息时间的灵活性可能是有害的,也是不可抗拒的。© 2016 Wiley Periodicals,Inc.海军研究后勤63:3-22,2016
This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016
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