Who "believes" in the Gambler's Fallacy and why?
Who "believes" in the Gambler's Fallacy and why?
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DOI：
10.1037/xge0000245
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发表时间：
2017-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Hahn, Ulrike
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Farmer, George D.;Warren, Paul A.;Hahn, Ulrike
人类具有区分环境中结构性和随机性的非凡能力。然而，这种能力似乎是系统性的偏见。这一点在《赌徒谬误》(《火焰杯》)中表现得最为明显--人们错误地认为，观察到一枚无偏硬币上越来越长的“正面”序列，就更有可能在下一次审判中出现“反面”。尽管GF似乎提供了“认知偏差”的证据，但最近的一项理论解释表明，如果考虑到对随机来源(如注意力和短期记忆)的实际体验的限制，GF可能是可以理解的。在这里，我们通过让参与者接触到来自真正随机(p=.5)伯努利过程的200个结果来测试这个经验性的描述。所有参与者都看到了相同的整体序列；然而，我们处理了不同组的经验，将序列分成了长度为100、10或5的区块。在暴露之前和之后，参与者(A)生成随机序列，(B)判断呈现序列的随机性。与文献中的其他描述相反，经验性的描述表明，这种操纵将导致暴露后行为的系统性差异。我们的数据与这一预测非常一致，并为随机性感知的一般解释提供了支持，其中偏差实际上是经验约束下环境统计的反映。这表明，如果我们假设人类在约束下是理性的，而不是将明显的偏见视为失败，那么我们可能会获得对人类认知的更深层次的洞察。
Humans possess a remarkable ability to discriminate structure from randomness in the environment. However, this ability appears to be systematically biased. This is nowhere more evident than in the Gambler’s Fallacy (GF)—the mistaken belief that observing an increasingly long sequence of “heads” from an unbiased coin makes the occurrence of “tails” on the next trial ever more likely. Although the GF appears to provide evidence of “cognitive bias,” a recent theoretical account has suggested the GF might be understandable if constraints on actual experience of random sources (such as attention and short term memory) are taken into account. Here we test this experiential account by exposing participants to 200 outcomes from a genuinely random (p = .5) Bernoulli process. All participants saw the same overall sequence; however, we manipulated experience across groups such that the sequence was divided into chunks of length 100, 10, or 5. Both before and after the exposure, participants (a) generated random sequences and (b) judged the randomness of presented sequences. In contrast to other accounts in the literature, the experiential account suggests that this manipulation will lead to systematic differences in postexposure behavior. Our data were strongly in line with this prediction and provide support for a general account of randomness perception in which biases are actually apt reflections of environmental statistics under experiential constraints. This suggests that deeper insight into human cognition may be gained if, instead of dismissing apparent biases as failings, we assume humans are rational under constraints.
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影响因子：
7.2
作者：
Cowan N
通讯作者：
Cowan N
影响因子：
4.7
作者：
Croson, R;Sundali, J
通讯作者：
Sundali, J
影响因子：
4.1
作者：
NEURINGER, A
通讯作者：
NEURINGER, A
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
Howes A;Warren PA;Farmer G;El-Deredy W;Lewis RL
通讯作者：
Lewis RL
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
Bakeman, R
通讯作者：
Bakeman, R