Evolution of cooperation in lattice population with adaptive interaction intensity
Evolution of cooperation in lattice population with adaptive interaction intensity
复制标题
具有自适应相互作用强度的格子群体合作演化
DOI:
10.1016/j.physa.2012.12.031
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发表时间:
2013-05
影响因子:
3.3
通讯作者:
Wang Long
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li Zhi;Gao Jia;Il Hong Suh;Wang Long
We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively interaction intensity. Individuals adjust their interaction intensity according to the rules “payoff increase-high intensity, payoff decrease-low intensity”: if an individual’s payoff increases compared with that in the previous generation, he raises his interaction intensity; otherwise, he reduces the probability of interaction. We find that if individuals can adjust their interaction intensity with a proper scale, cooperation can be promoted. Interestingly, individuals with low interaction intensity usually hold the boundary of cooperator cluster. Such spatial distribution can alleviate the exploitation from defectors to cooperators since the interaction between cooperators and defectors is weakened. We hope our work can yield some insight into investigation of the evolution of cooperation in structured population.
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