Analyticity: The Carnap-Quine Debate

分析性：卡纳普与奎因之争

• 批准号: 8619308
• 负责人: Richard Creath
• 金额: $ 1.8万
• 依托单位: Arizona State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-06-01 至 1989-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8619308&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Analyticity; Carnap; Quine; Debate

The Carnap-Quine debate in the first half of this century addressed nothing less than the very foundations of scientific truth. The central issue concerns the differing bases for asserting the truth of analytic versus synthetic statements in science. "Analytic" statements are those which are true a priori while "synthetic" statements are contingent and based on empirical evidence. Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) argued that the axioms of arithmetic, logic and other bodies of a priori doctrine can be construed as implicit definitions of the terms they contain. Thus, in order to be justified in believing such axioms, we need only understand the meanings of the terms; no appeal to intuition is required. Because these claims and those which follow from them could become known through an analysis of meaning, Carnap called such claims analytic; all others were called synthetic. Around these central notions of meaning and analyticity, Carnap built a systematic theory of knowledge and that an approach to most of the other major problems of philosophy of science. This approach was the foundation of "logical positivism." W. V. O. Quine (1908- ) challenged this theory beginning in 1934. He went to the very foundations of logical positivism by rejecting outright any distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. He went on to develop an epistemology to replace Carnap's without retreating to a reliance on intuition, but instead justified the body of our beliefs as a whole based on the outcome of suitable processes of revision operating on antecedent totalities of belief. This debate between Carnap and Quine is one of the central episodes in the development of contemporary philosophy of science. Dr. Creath, under this grant, will examine this debate using a massive amount of documentary evidence which has only just recently become available. His purpose is to show that the debate is not merely of parochial semantic interest but concerns fundamental strategies in the theory of knowledge of central importance for our understanding of the nature of science. The project will contribute both to our historical understanding of philosophy of science and advance our systematic treatment of ongoing issues as well.

本世纪上半叶的卡尔纳-奎因辩论讨论了 正是科学真理的基础 的 核心问题涉及断言真理的不同基础， 科学中的分析陈述与综合陈述。 “分析” 陈述是那些先验为真而“合成”的陈述。 这些陈述是偶然的，并以经验证据为基础。 鲁道夫 卡尔纳普（1891-1970）认为，算术、逻辑和 先验学说的其他主体可以被解释为隐含的， 它们所包含的术语的定义。 因此，为了成为 在相信这些公理的理由，我们只需要了解 术语的含义;不需要诉诸直觉。 因为 这些主张和由此产生的主张可能会被人们所知， 通过对意义的分析，卡尔纳普称这种主张是分析性的; 所有其他的都被称为合成的。 围绕着这些核心概念， 意义和分析性，卡尔纳普建立了一个系统的理论， 知识和解决大多数其他主要问题的方法， 科学哲学 这种方法是“逻辑”的基础。 实证主义“W. V. O.奎因（1908- ）对这一理论提出了挑战 从1934年开始。 他去了逻辑的基础 实证主义通过彻底拒绝任何分析和 合成真理 他继续发展了一种认识论， 卡尔纳普并没有退回到依赖直觉，而是 我们的信仰作为一个整体的基础上证明了我们的身体的结果， 适当的修订过程对先前的总体运作， 信仰 卡尔纳普和奎因之间的这场辩论是 当代科学哲学发展中的一些插曲。 Creath博士，根据这项拨款，将使用一个 大量的文件证据，直到最近才被发现， 变得可用。 他的目的是表明这场辩论不是 仅仅是狭隘的语义兴趣，但涉及基本的 战略在知识理论的核心重要性，为我们 理解科学的本质。 该项目将有助于 对科学哲学的历史理解， 我们还将继续系统地处理当前的问题。