Analyticity: Carnap, Quine, and the Structure of Science

分析性：卡尔纳普、蒯因和科学结构

• 批准号: 9515398
• 负责人: Richard Creath
• 金额: $ 8.5万
• 依托单位: Arizona State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Fixed Amount Award
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-06-01 至 1998-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9515398&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Analyticity; Carnap; Quine; Structure; Science

"Creationist science" is continually being raised by fundamentalists who claim that it should have standing beside Darwinian evolutionary theory in the teaching of biology in our schools. In fact, in the recent elections in Virginia, attempts were made to elect a school board which would support the teaching of creationist science. Yet for scientists, the very words "creationist science" is an oxymoron. Creationism is based on revealed religion while science is empirically supported or justified. But what does this mean, "empirically supported"? How can we empirically confirm any theory unless we know what empirical confirmation is? And on pain of circularity it appears that that theory of confirmation must itself be established independently of the empirical evidence. Otherwise, we would be saying that we believe some theory of confirmation simply because that theory assures us that it itself is worth believing in the circumstances. Furthermore, even the barest empiricist doctrine seems to presuppose something that cannot be tested empirically (or at least not noncircularly so), namely that observation is to be trusted. The classical answer to support of beliefs is intuition. Intuition, however, is an appeal to a direct metaphysical insight, a non-observational grasp of independent matters of fact. Such an answer, though, answer is appalling to anyone who takes science seriously or, for that matter, anyone who wants to distinguish "creationism" from science. Under this grant, Professor Richard Creath is examining the competing answers to how science is justified which were given by two of the foremost leaders in the field of philosophy of science over the past fifty years: Rudolf Carnap W. V. O. Quine. These two philosophers of science have shaped the views of succeeding generations on how we are to conceive of the process of justifying our scientific beliefs. Using documents that have only recently become available, Professor Creath will articulate more fully than has been possible heretofore Carnap's and Quine's alternative philosophies of science and the searching criticisms that each made of the other. He will then extend and develop these criticisms in turn so as to bring the arguments of the Carnap-Quine debate fully to bear on current issues in the philosophy of science. This research thus promises to go a long way in clarifying the difference between a science that is based on empirical justification from a "science" that originates from divine or received sources.

“创造科学”不断被原教旨主义者提出，他们声称，在我们学校的生物学教学中，它应该与达尔文的进化论并驾齐驱。事实上，在弗吉尼亚州最近的选举中，人们试图选出一个支持神创论科学教学的学校董事会。然而，对科学家来说，“创造论科学”这个词本身就是一种矛盾修饰法。神创论是建立在启示宗教的基础上的，而科学是有经验支持的或有道理的。但这是什么意思，“有经验的支持”？除非我们知道什么是经验证实，否则我们如何从经验上证实任何理论呢？关于循环的痛苦，似乎确认理论本身必须独立于经验证据而建立起来。否则，我们就会说，我们之所以相信某种确证理论，仅仅是因为该理论向我们保证，在当时的情况下，它本身是值得相信的。此外，即使是最简单的经验主义学说似乎也假定了一些无法通过经验检验(或至少不是非循环检验)的东西，即观察是可信的。支持信仰的经典答案是直觉。然而，直觉是一种直接的形而上学的洞察，一种对独立事实的非观察性的把握。然而，这样的答案对于任何认真对待科学的人来说都是骇人听闻的，或者就这一点而言，任何想要区分“神创论”和科学的人都会感到震惊。根据这笔拨款，理查德·克里思教授正在研究过去50年来科学哲学领域的两位最重要的领导人--鲁道夫·卡尔纳普·W·V·O·奎因--对科学如何被证明是正当的，提出了相互竞争的答案。这两位科学哲学家塑造了后代关于我们如何构思证明我们的科学信念的过程的观点。利用最近才有的文件，克里思教授将比卡尔纳普和奎因的另类科学哲学以及各自对彼此进行的尖锐批评更全面地阐明这一点。然后，他将依次扩展和发展这些批评，以便使卡尔纳普-奎因辩论的论点充分适用于科学哲学中的当前问题。因此，这项研究有望在澄清基于经验证明的科学与源自神学或接受来源的“科学”之间的区别方面大有裨益。