Social, Organizational, and Wage Efficiency

这项研究的目的是阐述效率工资的最新理论。考察了工人逃避的条件，并分析了激励劳动努力的替代社会和组织模式。主要论点是，社会和组织制度比工资补偿计划更有意义，可以激励人们努力工作。可供选择的模式在四个领域得到发展--组织和管理、家长制、亲属关系和合法性。并对劳动监察的性质和各种效率补偿制度进行了考察。这项研究采取了归纳的方法，而不是演绎的理论方法，后者的模型得到了来自商业历史、管理案例研究、劳资关系研究、家庭和亲属关系的人类学研究、工业社会学以及原创实地研究的数据的支持。该项目的意义在于，它确定了在哪些条件下可以使用替代简单工资差异的办法来激励工人更有效地工作，从而提高工作场所的生产力。这位首席研究员之前的工作对劳动经济学和宏观经济学的广泛领域都产生了非常大的影响。这个项目建立在他以前的一些工作的基础上，有充分的理由相信这项研究将成功进行。

The objective of this study is to elaborate upon recent theories of efficiency wages. The conditions under which workers shirk are examined and the alternative social and organizational models for motivating labor effort are analyzed. The principal thesis is that social and organizational regimes are more significant than wage compensation schemes as incentives to promote work effort. Alternative models are developed in four areas--organizational and managerial, paternalism, kinship, and legitimacy. The nature of labor supervision and various efficiency compensation regimes are also examined. The research takes an inductive, in contrast to a deductive, approach to theory, where the models are supported by data from business histories, management case studies, industrial relations research, anthropological studies of family and kinship, and industrial sociology, as well as original field research. The significance of this project is that it identifies conditions under which alternatives to simple wage differentials can be used to motivate workers to work more effectively and, thus, to be more productive in the work place. The principal investigator's previous work has been very influential over a broad spectrum both of labor economics and macroeconomics. This project builds on some of his previous work, and there is every reason to believe that this study will be successfully undertaken.