Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior

拍卖中的卖家和异质竞标者：不合作和串通的战略行为

• 批准号: 8708615
• 负责人: Robert Marshall
• 金额: $ 18.29万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-11-15 至 1990-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8708615&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Sellers; Heterogeneous; Bidders; Auctions; Non

Most of the existing research on auctions has been conducted within a non-cooperative framework with homogeneous risk neutral bidders where the risk neutral auctioneer can announce a reserve price. The contribution of this project comes from working in the relatively unexplored areas of heterogeneous bidders and bidder collusion. This research is motivated by observed behavior at auctions such as nested buyer ring formation, non-inclusive rings and lift-lining (phantom bidding) by auctioneers. The previous work explained the generation of phantom bids by practicing English auctions and the durability of bidder collusion. Further research is needed to generalize these results to more complex and realistic environments and to study other aspects of auctions. The high quality of the investigators' past research shows that they have the ability to do the work. The project investigates the behavior of heterogeneous bidders and the auctioneer at first price, Dutch, and second price auctions. Distributional information regarding bidders is usually unknown by the seller, so the processing of bid data by a Bayesian auctioneer and consequent strategic behavior are explored. The project explains why only all inclusive bidder coalitions are viable at first price and Dutch auctions and why coalitions of all sizes are observed at English auctions. The project investigates if certain bidder types are either undesirable to, or, unwilling to join a coalition in an English auction. Finally, the project explains how bidder coalitions try to avoid the incentive problems created by sharing the gains of coalition formation. Both simultaneous and sequential game models are used to study nesting of bidder coalitions and other ways of efficiently sharing the gains.

现有的大多数拍卖研究都是在具有同质风险中性投标人的非合作框架内进行的，在这种情况下，风险中性的拍卖人可以宣布保留价。该项目的贡献来自于在不同投标人和投标人串通这一相对未被探索的领域开展工作。本研究的动机是观察到拍卖人在拍卖中的行为，如嵌套买家环形成、非包含环和拍卖人的提升衬里(幻影竞价)。以前的工作解释了通过实践英国拍卖产生幻影投标的原因，以及投标人串通的持久性。还需要进一步的研究，以便将这些结果推广到更复杂和现实的环境中，并研究拍卖的其他方面。调查人员过往研究的高质量表明他们有能力做这项工作。该项目调查了异质投标人和拍卖商在第一价格、荷兰拍卖和第二价格拍卖中的行为。卖方通常不知道关于投标人的分布信息，因此研究了贝叶斯拍卖人对投标数据的处理以及由此产生的策略行为。该项目解释了为什么只有所有包容性竞标者联盟在第一价格和荷兰拍卖中都是可行的，以及为什么在英国拍卖中观察到各种规模的联盟。该项目调查某些类型的投标人是否不受欢迎，或不愿加入英国拍卖的联盟。最后，该项目解释了投标人联盟如何试图避免通过分享联盟形成的收益而产生的激励问题。同时和顺序博弈模型被用来研究投标人联盟的嵌套和其他有效分享收益的方式。