Dominant Strategy Theory and (NON-) Homogeneous Economies

这个项目的贡献来自于开发一种新的方法 经济理论的核心问题，即，的决定因素 市场失灵 经济学家已经编制了一个例外的分类， 市场效率。 例如，市场的最优性定理不 如果生产收益增加，或者公共产品 买或卖。 该项目使用了机制理论的发展， 经济模式与连续体的代理人，以发展一个更 对市场失灵进行了更全面、更有力的剖析。 本研究 建立在调查人员过去的工作基础上。 他们有能力做 中求进工作总 机构的研究是一个有吸引力的方法，因为它 一般性。 市场是许多不同类型的机制之一， 分配资源，因此市场可能无法实现经济增长。 其他机制可能不会失败的效率。 的 调查人员在他们以前的工作中表明， 机制失灵是由于垄断力量的存在， 回报、外部性和公共产品。 在这个项目中，他们刻画了有效优势策略 适用于可转让或不可转让效用的机制， 有限代理或非原子模型。 对于存在，或可行性， 在这些机制中，环境的同质性被证明是 决定性的条件，没有这个条件，就会发生机械故障。 市场失灵与机制失灵之间存在联系。 比较了贝叶斯纳什均衡和显性均衡 战略均衡 一个特殊的例子，双向拍卖模型， 研究的主导战略属性和研究结果被应用 在一个市场中达到均衡的问题， 代理商的数量。 理论上， 研究了双向拍卖市场。 非原子模型中的同质性与非同质性问题是 特别提到瓦尔拉斯的存在， 均衡，瓦尔拉斯均衡的特征， 完全竞争和垄断竞争现象。

The contribution of this project comes from developing a new approach to an issue central to economic theory, i.e., the determinants of market failure. Economists have compiled a taxonomy of exceptions to market efficiency. For example, optimality theorems for markets do not hold if the returns to production are increasing or if public goods are bought or sold. This project uses developments in mechanism theory and models of economies with a continuum of agents to develop a more general and more powerful anatomy of market failure. This research builds on past work by the investigators. They are capable of doing the work. The study of mechanisms is an attractive approach because of its generality. Markets are one of many different types of mechanisms for allocating resources, so markets may fail to achieve economic efficiency where some other mechanisms might not fail. The investigators have shown in their previous work that the source of mechanism failure is the presence of monopoly power due to increasing returns, externalities and public goods. In this project they characterize efficient dominant strategy mechanisms applicable to transferable or non-transferable utility and finite agent or nonatomic models. For the existence, or feasibility, of such mechanisms, homogenity of the environment is shown to be the decisive condition without which there is mechanism failure. Connections are drawn between mechanism failure and market failure. Comparisons are made between Bayesian Nash equilibrium and dominant strategy equilibrium. A special case, the double-auction model, is examined for dominant strategy properties and the findings are applied to the question of attainment of equilibrium in a market with a small number of agents. Theoretically, asymptotic properties of double-auction markets are investigated. The issue of homogeneity versus non-homogeneity in nonatomic models is addressed with special reference to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, the characterization of Walrasian equilibria that are not perfectly competitive, and the phenomenon of monopolistic competition.