Three Assignment Problems

三个分配问题

• 批准号: 9012155
• 负责人: Joseph Ostroy
• 金额: $ 7.44万
• 依托单位: University of California-Los Angeles
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-08-01 至 1992-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9012155&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Three; Assignment; Problems

The research agenda is divided into the following topics: (1) perfect competition in large assignment models; (2) efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium with innovation; and (3) specialization and division of labor and monetary exchange. The first part involves extending the basic model assigning a finite number of individuals to a finite number of positions to one in which the number of individuals and positions are infinite and represented by a continuum. The second part consists of modeling the innovation problem as a two-tiered assignment problem in which the allocation of resources, including the commodities available for sale, is influenced by occupational choices. The third part examines the trade-off between the technological advantages of assignments exhibiting specialization and division of labor and the disadvantages of such assignments in terms of the demands that this places on the technology of exchange. Research on all three topics is potentially extremely important. In the first topic the proposed work could lead to a new way of conceptualizing competition that would capture as special cases such criteria as non manipulability of prices and the appropriation of agents' marginal contributions. The assignment model has a rich history as a laboratory for the development of important new theories such as linear programming and core theory. Past work by the investigator and his collaborators suggests that their study of the uniqueness of equilibrium prices in large assignment models could provide another new, powerful analytical tool for economic theory. The second and third parts should provide new insights into such fundamental questions as: how are new commodities introduced? why are markets incomplete? how does specialization and the division of labor depend on the exchange process, or transaction technology?

研究议程分为以下主题：（1） 大型分配模型中的完全竞争;（2）效率 具有创新的竞争均衡的性质;（3） 专业化分工和货币交换。 的 第一部分涉及扩展基本模型， 一个人的数量有限的立场，以一个在 个体和位置的数量是无限的， 由连续体表示。 第二部分包括建模 创新问题是一个两层分配问题， 资源的分配，包括现有的商品 销售，受职业选择的影响。 第三部分 研究了技术优势之间的权衡， 展示专业化和劳动分工的任务， 这种分配的缺点是， 在交换技术上。 对这三个主题的研究可能极其重要。 在第一个专题中，拟议的工作可能导致一种新的方式， 将竞争概念化， 价格不可操纵性和专用性等标准 代理人的边际贡献。 分配模型具有丰富的 历史作为重要新事物发展的实验室 线性规划和核心理论等理论。 过去的工作 研究者和他的合作者认为， 大型分配模型中均衡价格的唯一性 可以提供另一种新的，强大的分析工具， 理论 第二部分和第三部分应该提供新的见解 这些基本问题，比如：新商品 介绍？为什么市场是不完整的？专业化和 劳动分工取决于交换过程，或者 交易技术？