Three Assignment Problems
Three Assignment Problems
批准号:
9012155
负责人:
Joseph Ostroy
金额:
$7.44万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1990
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1990-08-01 至 1992-07-31
中文摘要
研究议程分为以下主题:(1)大分配模型中的完全竞争;(2)竞争均衡与创新的效率性质;(3)专业化和分工与货币交换。第一部分涉及扩展基本模型,将有限数量的个体分配给有限数量的位置,变成其中个体的数量和位置的数量是无限的并且由一个连续体来表示。第二部分将创新问题建模为一个两层分配问题,其中包括可供销售的商品在内的资源的分配受到职业选择的影响。第三部分从对交换技术的要求出发,考察了表现出专业化和分工的转让的技术优势与劣势之间的权衡。对这三个主题的研究可能是极其重要的。在第一个专题中,拟议的工作可能导致一种将竞争概念化的新方法,将价格不可操纵性和代理人边际贡献的挪用等标准作为特例。分配模型作为发展重要的新理论,如线性规划和核心理论的实验室,有着丰富的历史。这位研究者和他的合作者过去的工作表明,他们对大型分配模型中均衡价格唯一性的研究可能会为经济理论提供另一种新的、强大的分析工具。第二部分和第三部分应该为以下基本问题提供新的见解:新的大宗商品是如何推出的?为什么市场是不完整的?专业化和分工如何取决于交换过程或交易技术?
英文摘要
The research agenda is divided into the following topics: (1) perfect competition in large assignment models; (2) efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium with innovation; and (3) specialization and division of labor and monetary exchange. The first part involves extending the basic model assigning a finite number of individuals to a finite number of positions to one in which the number of individuals and positions are infinite and represented by a continuum. The second part consists of modeling the innovation problem as a two-tiered assignment problem in which the allocation of resources, including the commodities available for sale, is influenced by occupational choices. The third part examines the trade-off between the technological advantages of assignments exhibiting specialization and division of labor and the disadvantages of such assignments in terms of the demands that this places on the technology of exchange. Research on all three topics is potentially extremely important. In the first topic the proposed work could lead to a new way of conceptualizing competition that would capture as special cases such criteria as non manipulability of prices and the appropriation of agents' marginal contributions. The assignment model has a rich history as a laboratory for the development of important new theories such as linear programming and core theory. Past work by the investigator and his collaborators suggests that their study of the uniqueness of equilibrium prices in large assignment models could provide another new, powerful analytical tool for economic theory. The second and third parts should provide new insights into such fundamental questions as: how are new commodities introduced? why are markets incomplete? how does specialization and the division of labor depend on the exchange process, or transaction technology?
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会议论文
Flexibility and Uncertainty: Implications for Aggregate Fluctuations
-
批准号:9211604
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$12.41万
-
财政年份:1992
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
-
依托单位:
Dominant Strategy Theory and (NON-) Homogeneous Economies
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批准号:8711519
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$9.91万
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财政年份:1987
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
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依托单位:
Modern Marginal Productivity Theory
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批准号:8510682
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$8.13万
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财政年份:1985
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
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依托单位:
Thick and Thin Market Models in General Equilibrium Theory
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批准号:8310103
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$3.15万
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财政年份:1983
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
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依托单位:
Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium and an Approach to Non-Perfect Competition
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批准号:7718086
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.95万
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财政年份:1977
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
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依托单位:
Theoretical Analysis of Large Economies
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批准号:7417982
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.98万
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财政年份:1974
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负责人:Joseph Ostroy
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依托单位:
海外基金