Imperfect Competition and Price Stability in General Equilibrium

一般均衡下的不完全竞争与价格稳定

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    8713818
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    1987
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    1987-08-01 至 1989-01-31
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

This project addresses two major gaps in general equilibrium theory: a full treatment of monopolistic competition and an explanation of the convergence of prices towards their equilibrium values. These are fundamental and as yet unresolved problems in economic theory. The insights from this project should improve the basic paradigm used by economic theorists to study market performance. Imperfect competition is modelled by taking firms to be "moderately small," although not so small the situation is essentially perfectly competitive. "Smallness" should be defined endogenously, by free entry in large markets, not by assuming that firms having rising average cost curves after a point. Prices are chosen by firms, but production requires time so that the competition is effectively Cournot-like. Stability theory has to be reconsidered as a learning process. Prices should be formed by firms making rational decisions. This is made possible by recognizing that out of equilibrium either sellers or buyers have market power. There is incomplete information. Each round yields a set of signals in the form of excess supplies or demands for individual firms. From this they can update their priors on the unknown parameters of the economy. In the next round, they choose production before the market opens and also choose new prices. Since the process is one of cumulative information (past signals still enter into present decisions), the failure of standard stability theory may not prevent better results in convergence.
这个项目解决了一般均衡理论中的两个主要空白:全面对待垄断竞争和解释价格向其均衡价值趋同。这些都是经济学理论中的根本性问题,也是尚未解决的问题。这个项目的见解应该会改进经济理论家用来研究市场表现的基本范式。不完全竞争的模式是将公司视为“适度小”,尽管不是那么小,但这种情况本质上是完全竞争的。“小”应该通过自由进入大市场来定义,而不是假设公司的平均成本曲线在某一点之后上升。价格由企业决定,但生产需要时间,因此竞争实际上就像古诺一样。稳定性理论必须被重新考虑为一个学习过程。价格应该由企业做出理性决策来形成。这是因为认识到,在不均衡的情况下,卖方或买方都拥有市场力量。有不完整的信息。每一轮都会产生一系列信号,表现为个别公司的过剩供应或需求。由此,他们可以根据未知的经济参数更新自己的前科。在下一轮中,他们在市场开盘前选择生产,也选择新的价格。由于这个过程是一个累积的信息(过去的信号仍然进入现在的决策),标准稳定性理论的失败可能不会阻止更好的收敛结果。

项目成果

期刊论文数量(0)
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会议论文数量(0)
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Kenneth Arrow其他文献

Social Capital and Economic Performance: Analytics
社会资本和经济绩效:分析
  • DOI:
    10.1002/bdm.2180
  • 发表时间:
    2002
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    2
  • 作者:
    Partha Dasgupta;Elinor Ostrom;Ismail Serageldin;Ismail Serageldin's;Kenneth Arrow;Scott Barrett;Mary Douglas;Y. Elkana;Stanley Engerman;Diego Gambetta;Jack Goody;Dale Jorgenson;David Landes;Margaret Levi;K. Mäler;Sheilagh Ogilvie;Robert Putnam;P. Seabright;R. Solow;S. Szreter
  • 通讯作者:
    S. Szreter
As Críticas de Amartya Sen à Teoria da Escolha Social de
正如阿马蒂亚·森·特奥里亚·社会学院的评论家
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2014
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    Kenneth Arrow
  • 通讯作者:
    Kenneth Arrow
Microeconomics and operations research: Their interactions and differences
  • DOI:
    10.1007/s10796-014-9539-9
  • 发表时间:
    2014-10-21
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    8.300
  • 作者:
    Kenneth Arrow
  • 通讯作者:
    Kenneth Arrow

Kenneth Arrow的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Kenneth Arrow', 18)}}的其他基金

Conference on Econometrics and Mathematical Economics (1992-1993)being held at Caracas, Venezula Dec, 1992; Univ of CA, March 1993 and Inst for Advanced Stds, Vienna, Austri
计量经济学和数理经济学会议(1992-1993),1992年12月在委内瑞拉加拉加斯举行;
  • 批准号:
    9300987
  • 财政年份:
    1993
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Costly Information and Individual and Social Resource Allocation
昂贵的信息以及个人和社会资源分配
  • 批准号:
    9209892
  • 财政年份:
    1992
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Conference on Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, 1990-1991, Cambridge, Massachusetts
计量经济学和数理经济学会议,1990-1991,马萨诸塞州剑桥
  • 批准号:
    8921873
  • 财政年份:
    1990
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Dynamic Pricing Policies: Duopoly Equilibrium and Information Acquisition
动态定价政策:双头垄断均衡与信息获取
  • 批准号:
    8821925
  • 财政年份:
    1989
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Economic Interaction Under Bounded Rationality and Limited Memory (Information Science)
有限理性和有限记忆下的经济互动(信息科学)
  • 批准号:
    8521838
  • 财政年份:
    1986
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Risk, the Market, and Rational Social Choice
风险、市场和理性社会选择
  • 批准号:
    8314214
  • 财政年份:
    1984
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Three Issues in the Microeconomics of Inflation
通货膨胀微观经济学的三个问题
  • 批准号:
    8209478
  • 财政年份:
    1982
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Intrafirm and Interfirm Information Flows and Their Effects On Firm Size, Innovation, and Price Flexibility
公司内部和公司间信息流及其对公司规模、创新和价格灵活性的影响
  • 批准号:
    8201372
  • 财政年份:
    1982
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Studies in Dynamic Economics
动态经济学研究
  • 批准号:
    7619573
  • 财政年份:
    1977
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Studies in Dynamic Economics
动态经济学研究
  • 批准号:
    7309142
  • 财政年份:
    1973
  • 资助金额:
    $ 7.56万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant

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领域:结构性实证IO和微观经济学理论 价格政策变化对需求和竞争的影响论文
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    22530239
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  • 批准号:
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