Models & Tests of Political Business Cycles

楷模

• 批准号: 8721221
• 负责人: Joe Stone
• 金额: $ 13.1万
• 依托单位: University of Oregon Eugene
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-04-01 至 1990-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8721221&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Models; & Tests; Political; Business

Despite some evidence of both partisan cycles (cycles in which political incumbents pursue partisan economic policies) and electoral cycles (in which incumbent parties manipulate the economy to improve the prospect of reelection), satisfactory theoretical models consistent with this evidence have not been developed. This two-year project develops and tests such models, concentrating on reconciling the partisan and electoral models and on resolving the inconclusiveness of previous tests. More specifically, the project (1) develops and simulates a simple stochastic model of an economy in which gents are rational, markets are efficient, but information is incomplete, where an incumbent government with given preferences over inflation and unemployment can generate stochastic business cycles; (2) extends this model to account for partisan cycles by introducing a second party, elections, and heterogeneous voters; (3) tests the partisan model against observed policies, central macrovariables, and micro-level voter behavior; (4) extends the partisan model to include a forward-looking incumbent party which induces electoral cycles to signal its preferences so as to increase the probability of reelection; (5) explores the natures of the partisan equilibrium with electoral cycles; and (6) tests the synthesized partisan electoral model against data for the United States (both pre and post-World War II) and for other countries with fixed electoral terms.

尽管有一些关于党派周期(政治在位者追求党派经济政策的周期)和选举周期(在位政党操纵经济以改善连任前景)的证据，但与这一证据一致的令人满意的理论模型尚未开发出来。这个为期两年的项目开发和测试这样的模型，专注于协调党派和选举模型，并解决以前测试的不确定性。更具体地说，该项目(1)开发和模拟了一个简单的随机经济模型，其中绅士是理性的，市场是有效的，但信息是不完全的，其中现任政府对通胀和失业具有给定的偏好，可以产生随机的商业周期；(2)通过引入第二党、选举和不同种类的选民，将该模型扩展到考虑党派周期；(3)根据观察到的政策、中央宏观变量和微观选民行为对党派模型进行检验；(4)扩展党派模型以包括一个具有前瞻性的在位政党，该政党诱导选举周期发出信号以增加连任的概率；(5)探索党派均衡与选举周期的本质；以及(6)根据美国(二战前和二战后)以及其他具有固定选举条件的国家的数据来测试合成的党派选举模型。