The Effect of Market Size on the Efficiency of Markets with Private Information

在一个市场中，交易者对市场的保留价值是指 被交易的商品可能是私人的，只有他知道。 这 隐私使他在出价或出价时能够误报 从战略上讲，它的真正价值。 在小市场，由于 战略误报，交易机制执行低效 分配至少部分时间。 在大型市场中， 低效率消失了，因为每个交易者都可以忽略不计， 不能有效地操纵价格。 该项目确定并验证了基础架构 市场的特点。 一个这样的猜想是 在一般情况下，交易者的数量增加一倍（1） 将交易员误报的最大金额减半， 保留值和（2）季度机制效率低下。 另一个猜想是，没有一个密封的出价双均衡， 拍卖具有事前有效的性能，无论有多少 商人有。 该项目还比较了结构性市场的表现 例如具有分散交易所的双重拍卖。 的 这项研究的结果应该提高我们对 有组织的市场的优势，以及为什么这样做的原因 机构发展。

Within a market the reservation value that a trader places on the good being traded may be private, known to him alone. This privacy enables him when he makes a bid or an offer to misreport strategically his true value. In small markets, because of this strategic misreporting, trading mechanisms implement inefficient allocations at least part of the time. In large markets this inefficiency vanishes because each trader is negligible and can not manipulate the price effectively. This project identifies and verifies fundamental conjectures about the characteristics of markets. One such conjecture is that under general conditions doubling the number of traders (1) halves the maximal amount by which traders misreport their reservation values and (2) quarters the mechanism inefficiency. Another conjecture is that no equilibrium of a sealed bid double auction has ex ante efficient performance, no matter how many traders there are. The project also compares the performance of structured markets such as double auctions with decentralized exchanges. The results of this study should improve our understanding of the advantages of organized markets and the reason why such institutions developed.