Strategic Behavior in Small Markets

小市场中的战略行为

• 批准号: 9009546
• 负责人: Mark Satterthwaite
• 金额: $ 8.99万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-07-01 至 1993-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9009546&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Strategic; Behavior; Small; Markets

This project studies how the strategic behavior of economic agents shapes equilibrium outcomes within small markets. It has three parts. (1) The first is bilateral bargaining when the bargainers have the option to break off the bargaining and seek another bargaining partner. The project seeks to show that the presence of this outside option changes equilibrium bilateral bargaining behavior from being essentially indeterminate to being essentially determined. The efficiency of decentralized markets with bilateral bargaining is also compared to centralized markets with multilateral bargaining. (2) The second part is the study of the behavior of duopolists whose costs are declining through learning- by-doing. Each period each firm decides how aggressively it should produce so as to reduce its costs further. The goal is to characterize the variety of subgame perfect equilibria that can exist when learning is important. (3) The third part involves the use of heuristics by economic agents within dynamic games. A heuristic approximates the value function that the agent would use if he or she were perfectly rational. The goal is to understand how the presence of such boundedly rational agents changes the set of equilibria. This research is important because it addresses one of the basic limitations in bargaining theory, i.e., bilateral bargaining theory with incomplete information has been unable to narrow in an interesting way the wide range of outcomes that are compatible with at least one reasonable equilibrium. The contribution from the first part of this project comes from exploring a neglected aspect of the bargaining problem that could provide determinate solutions. Conventional models of bilateral, incomplete information bargaining neglect the option bargainers have of breaking-off bargaining with a particular partner and bargaining with a new partner from the outside. The project studies bilateral, incomplete information bargaining with the outside option explicitly modeled. Preliminary work by the investigator demonstrates that introducing the outside option in bargaining models may eliminate the indeterminacy found in standard models. The research should provide useful new analytical tools and valuable substantive insights into the many bargaining problems in economics.

本项目研究经济主体的战略行为如何 在小市场中形成均衡结果。 它有三 零件. (1)第一种是双边讨价还价， 可以选择中断谈判，寻求另一个 谈判伙伴 该项目旨在表明， 这种外部选择改变了均衡的双边谈判 行为从本质上不确定到本质上 测定 双边分散市场的效率 讨价还价也被比作集中市场， 多边谈判。 (2)第二部分是对《红楼梦》的研究。 双寡头的行为，其成本通过学习而下降， 由做。 每个时期，每个公司都要决定 生产以进一步降低其成本。 目标是 描述子博弈完美均衡的多样性， 当学习很重要的时候。 (3)第三部分涉及 经济主体在动态博弈中使用策略。 一 启发式近似代理将使用的值函数 如果他或她是完全理性的。 我们的目标是了解 这种有限理性的代理人的存在如何改变集合 平衡的。 这项研究很重要，因为它解决了一个基本的问题， 谈判理论的局限性，即，双边谈判理论 由于信息不全， 有趣的方式，广泛的结果，是兼容的， 至少有一个合理的平衡。 的贡献 这个项目的第一部分来自于探索一个被忽视的方面 能提供确定解决方案的谈判问题。 传统的双边不完全信息讨价还价模型 忽视了谈判者的选择权， 一个特定的合作伙伴和讨价还价的新伙伴从 外面 该项目研究双边的、不完整的信息 与明确建模的外部选项讨价还价。 初步 研究人员的工作表明， 谈判模型中的期权可以消除发现的不确定性 在标准模型中。 这项研究应该提供有用的新信息。 分析工具和宝贵的实质性见解， 经济学中的讨价还价问题。