Realism and Scientific Instrumentation

现实主义和科学仪器

• 批准号: 8807867
• 负责人: Harold Brown
• 金额: $ 0.77万
• 依托单位: Northern Illinois University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-07-15 至 1989-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8807867&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Realism; Scientific; Instrumentation

There has been a long and as yet unresolved debate between realism and instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. Realists of various stripes want to argue that the theories of science are either true or are becoming closer and closer approximations to the truth about how the world works. Realists, for example, would argue that quarks really exist. Instrumentalists (anti-realists) argue that it is impossible to know whether our theories are true. Rather, they argue, the only valid point in our study of science is to see if the theories work, i.e. whether they make correct predictions. They would argue that it is impossible to know whether quarks exist, but they do serve as a good "instrument" for predicting what will happen in certain experiments. Under this grant, Dr. Brown is seeking to develop and defend a new version of scientific realism that he calls "weak realism." Weak realism can be summarized in two theses: (1) One aim of science is the development of theories that provide true descriptions of features of the world; (2) Because of the growing variety and sophistication of scientific instrumentation, our ability to pursue this goal has been increasing. Weak realism stands in contrast to those antirealist views which deny that the pursuit of truth is a legitimate scientific aim. Weak realism also stands in contrast to other extant versions of scientific realism since weak realism does not require that any current scientific theories be true or approximately true, or that the entities postulated in these theories exist. Still, the view that Dr. Brown calls "weak realism" is a considerably stronger form of realism than others currently under debate. What is especially important about this approach, in contrast to earlier efforts, is the emphasis on the role of increasingly sophisticated instrumentation in the argumentative route to realism. Dr. Brown will carefully examine in a way that philosophers of science have not previous done the role of this highly complex instrumentation in the development of contemporary scientific theories.

之间存在着长期且尚未解决的争论 科学哲学中的实在论和工具论。 各种各样的现实主义者都认为， 科学要么是真的，要么是越来越接近 世界如何运作的真相的近似值。 现实主义者， 比如说，会认为夸克真的存在 工具主义者（反现实主义者）认为， 知道我们的理论是否正确。 相反，他们认为， 我们研究科学的一个有效点是看看理论是否 #21453;，即他们是否做出了正确的预测。 他们会 有人认为，不可能知道夸克是否存在，但 它们确实是一种很好的“工具”， 发生在某些实验中。 根据这项补助金，布朗博士是 寻求发展和捍卫科学实在论的新版本 他称之为“弱现实主义”。“弱现实主义可以概括为 两个论点：（1）科学的目的之一是发展 提供世界特征真实描述的理论; (2)由于越来越多的种类和复杂性， 科学仪器，我们追求这一目标的能力 一直在增加。 弱现实主义与那些 反现实主义的观点，否认追求真理是一种 合理的科学目的。 弱现实主义也与之形成对照 从弱实在论到其他现存的科学实在论 不要求任何现有的科学理论是正确的， 近似真实，或者这些假设中的实体 理论存在。 尽管如此，布朗博士所说的“弱”观点 现实主义”是一种比其他形式更强的现实主义 目前正在辩论中。 这其中特别重要的是 与早期的努力相反，这种方法强调 日益复杂的仪器在 从争论走向现实主义。 布朗医生会仔细检查 这是科学哲学家们以前没有做过的 这种高度复杂的仪器在发展中的作用 当代科学理论。