Realism and Scientific Instrumentation

在科学哲学中，现实主义和工具主义之间存在着一场旷日持久且尚未解决的争论。形形色色的现实主义者想要争辩说，科学理论要么是正确的，要么正变得越来越接近关于世界如何运行的真理。例如，现实主义者会争辩说夸克确实存在。工具主义者(反现实主义者)辩称，不可能知道我们的理论是否正确。相反，他们认为，我们研究科学的唯一有效观点是看看这些理论是否有效，即它们是否做出了正确的预测。他们会争辩说，不可能知道夸克是否存在，但夸克确实是预测某些实验中会发生什么的一个很好的“工具”。在这笔拨款下，布朗博士正在寻求开发和捍卫一种新版本的科学实在论，他称之为“弱现实主义”。弱现实主义可以概括为两篇论文：(1)科学的一个目标是发展对世界特征提供真实描述的理论；(2)由于科学仪器的日益多样化和复杂性，我们追求这一目标的能力一直在增强。虚弱的现实主义与那些否认追求真理是合法的科学目的的反现实主义观点形成了鲜明对比。弱实在论也与科学实在论的其他现存版本形成对比，因为弱实在论并不要求任何当前的科学理论为真或近似为真，也不要求这些理论中假设的实体存在。不过，布朗博士称之为“弱现实主义”的观点，与目前正在辩论的其他观点相比，是一种相当强烈的现实主义形式。与以前的努力不同，这种方法特别重要的是，它强调了越来越复杂的工具在通向现实主义的论证道路上的作用。布朗博士将以一种科学哲学家们以前从未在当代科学理论发展中扮演过这种高度复杂的工具的角色的方式，仔细研究。

There has been a long and as yet unresolved debate between realism and instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. Realists of various stripes want to argue that the theories of science are either true or are becoming closer and closer approximations to the truth about how the world works. Realists, for example, would argue that quarks really exist. Instrumentalists (anti-realists) argue that it is impossible to know whether our theories are true. Rather, they argue, the only valid point in our study of science is to see if the theories work, i.e. whether they make correct predictions. They would argue that it is impossible to know whether quarks exist, but they do serve as a good "instrument" for predicting what will happen in certain experiments. Under this grant, Dr. Brown is seeking to develop and defend a new version of scientific realism that he calls "weak realism." Weak realism can be summarized in two theses: (1) One aim of science is the development of theories that provide true descriptions of features of the world; (2) Because of the growing variety and sophistication of scientific instrumentation, our ability to pursue this goal has been increasing. Weak realism stands in contrast to those antirealist views which deny that the pursuit of truth is a legitimate scientific aim. Weak realism also stands in contrast to other extant versions of scientific realism since weak realism does not require that any current scientific theories be true or approximately true, or that the entities postulated in these theories exist. Still, the view that Dr. Brown calls "weak realism" is a considerably stronger form of realism than others currently under debate. What is especially important about this approach, in contrast to earlier efforts, is the emphasis on the role of increasingly sophisticated instrumentation in the argumentative route to realism. Dr. Brown will carefully examine in a way that philosophers of science have not previous done the role of this highly complex instrumentation in the development of contemporary scientific theories.