The Nature of Conceptual Systems

概念系统的本质

• 批准号: 9818094
• 负责人: Harold Brown
• 金额: $ 7.79万
• 依托单位: Northern Illinois University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-06-01 至 2000-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9818094&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Nature; Conceptual; Systems

The goal of this project is to develop a general theory of concepts and apply it to two types of studies: 1) eases of conceptual change from the history of science; and 2) analyses of two concepts that are central to philosophy of science, causality and truth. The guiding theme of the project is that conceptual analyses and studies of conceptual change must be carried out on the basis of an explicit theory of concepts. The developed theory will provide accounts of the different types of concepts, explain how the content of these concepts is determined, provide criteria for an adequate conceptual analysis, yield a framework for comparing concepts from different scientific theories and historical periods, and provide a basis for understanding how new concepts are introduced.The methodology of this study combines philosophical analysis of concepts, metaphilosophical theory construction, and case studies of conceptual change from the history of science. The starting point for the project is an exposition and critical analysis of Wilfrid Sellars' theory of concepts, followed by the construction of an improved Sellarsian theory. The critical analysis will be based on three considerations: the internal logic of Sellars' position, comparisons with alternative views in the literature, and the ability of the theory to provide an understanding of examples of conceptual development and conceptual innovation in science. Concepts may be viewed from two complementary points of view: On one hand, concepts are psychological entities-cognitive tools that people use to think about specific topics. On the other hand, concepts can be studied as abstract structures independent of their implementation in individuals. This project will be concerned with concepts from the abstract point of view. The requirement that human concepts must be implementable in human minds provides a constraint on the acceptability of any theory of concepts, although this constraint will not be considered in the present project.The resulting theory of concepts will be applied to several studies of conceptual development from seventeenth-century and twentieth-century science; these studies will concern examples that were not used in developing the theory. Cases to be studied will include the development of concepts of dynamics from Galileo, through Descartes, to Newton; the introduction of the concept of an isotope; and developments in the concept of force in twentieth-century physics. It will be argued that one major advantage of the Sellarsian approach is its ability to provide a systematic basis for comparing concepts from competing theories, and for understanding how new concepts can be introduced by systematic alteration of existing concepts.The theory will also be applied to analyses of the concepts of causality and truth. In the case of causality, the theory will provide the basis for a detailed argument that philosophers defending different analyses of this concept are actually discussing different, but analogous, concepts. This result will lead to the proposal that debate on this concept should be refocused. Rather than seeking a single analysis of a presumed universal causal concept, philosophers should provide accounts of a variety of causal concepts as a basis for exploring which, if any, are instantiated in the world and found in various forms of discourse. The account of truth will develop a form of correspondence theory in which the notion of correspondence is introduced as a fruitful analogy, not a definitionThere will be two major outcomes of this project. The first will be a theory of concepts that can provide a richer basis for conceptual analyses and for studies of conceptual change in science than is provided by available competitors. The second will be a set of conceptual analyses and historical cases studies that are of interest in their own right, and which also provide evidence of the power of the new theory.

这个项目的目标是发展一个概念的一般理论，并将其应用于两种类型的研究：1）从科学史的概念变化的缓解;和2）分析两个概念是科学哲学的核心，因果关系和真理。该项目的指导主题是，必须在明确的概念理论基础上进行概念分析和概念变化研究。发展的概念理论将提供不同类型概念的解释，解释这些概念的内容是如何确定的，为充分的概念分析提供标准，为比较不同科学理论和历史时期的概念提供框架，并为理解新概念是如何引入的提供基础。本研究的方法结合了概念的哲学分析，元哲学理论构建，以及科学史上概念变化的案例研究。该项目的出发点是对威尔弗里德·塞拉斯的概念理论进行阐述和批判性分析，然后构建一个改进的塞拉斯理论。批判性分析将基于三个方面的考虑：塞拉斯立场的内在逻辑，与文献中其他观点的比较，以及该理论提供对科学概念发展和概念创新实例的理解的能力。概念可以从两个互补的角度来看待：一方面，概念是心理实体，是人们用来思考特定主题的认知工具。另一方面，概念可以作为独立于其在个人中的实现的抽象结构来研究。这个项目将从抽象的角度关注概念。人类概念必须在人类头脑中可实现的要求为任何概念理论的可接受性提供了一个约束，尽管这个约束在本项目中将不被考虑。由此产生的概念理论将被应用于17世纪和20世纪科学概念发展的几项研究;这些研究将关注在理论发展中没有使用的例子。将要研究的案例将包括从伽利略到笛卡尔再到牛顿的动力学概念的发展;同位素概念的引入;以及二十世纪物理学中力概念的发展。塞拉斯方法的一个主要优点是它能够提供一个系统的基础，用于比较竞争理论中的概念，并理解如何通过系统地改变现有概念来引入新概念，该理论也将被应用于因果关系和真理概念的分析。在因果关系的情况下，该理论将为一个详细的论点提供基础，即哲学家捍卫对这一概念的不同分析实际上是在讨论不同但类似的概念。这一结果将导致有人建议重新集中讨论这一概念。哲学家不应该寻求对一个假定的普遍因果概念的单一分析，而应该提供对各种因果概念的解释，作为探索的基础，如果有的话，这些概念在世界上被实例化，并在各种形式的话语中被发现。真理的解释将发展一种对应论的形式，在这种对应论中，对应的概念被引入作为一种富有成效的类比，而不是一种定义。第一个是概念理论，它可以为概念分析和科学概念变化的研究提供比现有竞争对手更丰富的基础。第二部分将是一系列概念分析和历史案例研究，这些分析和案例本身就很有意义，也为新理论的力量提供了证据。