Topics in Implementation Theory and Mechanism Design

该项目有助于实现理论，其中一个 最重要的领域在过去十年的经济理论。 执行理论以非常笼统的方式告诉我们， 不能通过激励性合同来实现。 这个项目 追求三个方向：机构设计的动态或 重复的环境，一般结果的应用 特定经济环境的实施理论，以及 代理人选择一个 机制 第一部分扩展了全面实施的基本模式， 动态设置，即，分配和收益 发生在一系列时期内。 第二部分适用于 实施理论对公共物品供给问题， 讨价还价和拍卖。 第三部分探讨问题 如何选择机制。 特别是，如果决定 游戏的机制是由玩家自己制作的， 过渡阶段，然后是选择 机制可以揭示信息。 该项目研究了 这种信息传递对机制选择的影响。 它 将此应用于研究不同企业的卡特尔如何分享 信息和勾结。 实施理论的进步很重要，因为 理论为分析人员提供了强大的分析工具， 研究制度设计。 这个领域的早期工作 导致了一般的不可能性定理，证明某些 基本的社会目标无法调和， 是必要的 调查人员和其他人最近的工作 取得了显著的成果， 经济体制的变化。 通过将这些模型扩展到 动态设置，调查人员将能够严格 研究制度演变的经济含义 随着时间

This project contributes to implementation theory, one of the most important areas in the last ten years of economic theory. Implementation theory tells us in very general terms what can and cannot be accomplished through incentive contracts. This project pursues three directions: mechanism design in dynamic or repeated environments, application of general results of implementation theory to specific economic settings, and theoretical modelling of processes by which agents choose a mechanism. The first part extends the basic model of full implementation to dynamic settings, i.e., settings in which allocations and payoffs occur over a sequence of periods. The second part applies implementation theory to problems of public goods provision, bargaining, and auctions. The third part explores the question of how mechanisms are selected. In particular, if the decision of which mechanism to play is made by the players themselves at the interim stage, then the actual process of selecting the mechanism may reveal information. The project studies the effects of this information transmission on mechanism choice. It applies this to the study of how cartels of diverse firms share information and collude. Advances in implementation theory are important because this theory provides analysts with powerful analytical tools for studying institutional design. The early work in this field resulted in general impossibility theorems, proofs that certain basic societal goals could not be reconciled and that trade-offs were necessary. Recent work by the investigators and others have obtained remarkable results about what can be accomplished by changes in economic institutions. By extending these models to a dynamic setting, the investigators will be able to rigorously study the economic implications of the evolution of institutions over time.